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Exemptions, Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform
WILLIAM J. WOODWARD, JR.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Exemptions in bankruptcy occupied a center stage in the reform process
leading to enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act.' Viewing exemptions as
central to the individual debtor's fresh start following bankruptcy, reformers
developed as part of the reform legislation a comprehensive set of exemptions
to be specifically available to debtors in bankruptcy. It came as a disappointment to many,3 therefore, that in enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act,
Congress gave to individual states the opportunity to control this component
considered so important in the reform process.
The new law provided that a state may enact specific legislation depriving
its debtors of the choice of using the exemptions found in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act4 and thereby confining those debtors to the use of exemptions
found in "State or local law applicable on the date of the filing of the petition
in the debtor's domicile.",5 Most of the thirty-two states that have chosen to
opt out 6 have done only that and simply stated within their generally applicable debtor's exemption legislation that their debtors are not authorized to
utilize the exemption provisions contained in the Bankruptcy Code.7 The
apparent intent is that the state's general debtors' exemption provisions are to
be used both outside bankruptcy and in bankruptcy as well.
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1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1980) (hereinafter referred to as the Code or
the Reform Act).
2. Id. § 522(d). Exemptions are available only to "individual debtors," id. § 522(b), whose bankruptcy
petitions constitute the vast bulk of total bankruptcy filings. See infra note 42.
3. See, e.g. Hertz, Bankruptcy Code Exemptions: Notes on the Effect of State Law. 54 AM. BANKR. L.J.
339, 354 (1980); Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Underthe BankruptcyReform Act, 58 N.C.L. REV. 769,
801 (1980).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1980).
5. Id. § 522(b)(2).
6. The term "'optout" has been used in this context by courts and commentators to denote a state's
exercise of the option given it by Congress to confine its debtors to exemptions in bankruptcy formulated by the
state legislature. See, e.g., Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60, 64 n.11 (4th Cir. 1981); Peoples, New Rules for
an Old Game, North Carolina'sNew Exemption Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 865 (1981). For a summary of
the pertinent state legislation, see infra text accompanying notes 66-87.
7. Indiana's provision is typical. It reads:
In accordance with section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C. 522(b)), in any bankruptcy proceeding, an individual debtor domiciled in Indiana:
(1) is not entitled to the federal exemptions as provided by section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code
of 1978 (11 U.S.C. 522(d)); and (2) may exempt from the property of the estate only that property
specified by Indiana law.
IND. CODE § 34-2-28-0.5 (Supp. 1980). Ohio and Georgia are among the seven states that have not followed this
pattern. See infra text accompanying notes 215-29.
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Because opting out may be accomplished by a one sentence provision,
there is danger that the full policy implications of the result may be ignored or
unseen in the state legislative process. Moreover, it seems that this prevalent
approach to opting out may proceed from an attempt to return the law to what
it was prior to enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, a sense that individuals in and out of bankruptcy should be treated the same, and a belief that
different exemption provisions for the two situations will supply debtors-or
creditors-with an incentive to file bankruptcy petitions. While these ideas
are appropriately considered within the legislative process, there is a danger
that they overwhelm the process and divert attention from the question
whether, from the standpoint of sound policy, a state's exemption provisions
should be used in the bankruptcy setting. Because the two debtor situations
(in and out of bankruptcy) have become so different,8 there is the possibility
that state exemptions, perhaps well suited for the nonbankruptcy situation,
will be ill-suited for use in bankruptcy. And because exemptions now play
such a critical role in bankruptcy, poorly designed exemptions within that
system might undercut much of the good the remedy is designed to provide.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the opting-out process and to
identify some of the problems that the opting-out process has generated. This
examination suggests that many legislatures have not fully realized the implications of opting out and that their opt-out legislation has produced problems that impose unnecessary costs on debtors and creditors alike? More
importantly, an examination of current opt-out legislation suggests that most
states are unduly rigid in attempting to recreate a pre-Reform Act status quo
and thereby miss an opportunity to tailor federal policy to local needs in the
best traditions of federalism.'0 Rather than suggest specifics-clearly inappropriate for a system designed to recognize different needs and traditions-the approach here will be to suggest an analytical framework within
which the state political process might approach the question of bankruptcy
exemptions appropriate for its debtors.
II. DEBTORS' EXEMPTIONS

AND BANKRUPTCY ExEMPIONS:
THE BACKGROUND

Introduction
The exemption concept has been with us for a long time. The idea is that
there should be a certain quantum of property owned by an individual that, for
various policy reasons, should not be reachable by most creditors seeking
satisfaction of their debts. Outside bankruptcy the exemption claim is generally raised by the debtor to defend against levy and execution on specific
8. As will be developed in the text, procedure, substantive rules, policy emphasis, and perhaps even
judicial temperament differ in the two systems.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 72-132.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 132-92.
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property by the sheriff. If the debtor is successful, that property may not be
taken. In bankruptcy the exemption claim is made within the bankruptcy
proceedings. Property found exempt is retained by the debtor while everything else of value" owned by the debtor is liquidated and distributed among
creditors.
While the general idea of allowing the debtor some quantity of property
free from the claims of creditors has existed in both bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy situations for centuries, the reasons thought to justify exemptions
have changed over time. It is, of course, those reasons that ultimately produce much of the content of specific exemption provisions. The changing
notions of the purposes of exemptions should be examined in both situations
because such a study both helps explain content and makes it easier to understand current attitudes toward those provisions.
A. History-Toward Unity

Statutes exempting some quantity of a debtor's property from the reach
of execution creditors are, in this country, largely rooted in early nineteenth
century economics and politics. 12 Most debtors' exemption statutes were
initially based on the eighteenth century Spanish Civil Code, 3 which, in turn,
was based on Roman law having the very practical purpose of maintaining an
adequate tax flow.' 4 The public interest was thought to be served by those
early exemptions because destitute persons were unlikely to pay taxes or
produce wealth that could be taxed. But while the earliest purpose of debtors'
exemptions may have been an economic one of keeping people productive, by
the early nineteenth century multiple objectives were reflected in the provi5
sions. Family protection and maintenance,' as well as family promotion, 16
had, for example, become important justifications for exempt property. The
goal of keeping the debtor productive continued to be reflected in exemptions
for tools of the trade and, perhaps, working homesteads such as farms and
ranches. But the dominant articulated conceptual basis for the nineteenth
century state debtors' exemption laws had become the basically humanitarian
11.

Property of "inconsequential value to the estate" is subject to abandonment by the trustee. II U.S.C.

§ 554 (1980).
12. Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1463 (1959).
13. Rombauer, Debtors' Exemption Statutes-Revision Ideas, 36 WASH. L. REV. 484, 485 (1961).
14. Id. See also Comment, PersonalPropertyExemptions and the Uniform Exemptions Act, 1978 B.Y.U.

L. REV. 462, 468 (1978).
15. Rombauer. Debtors' Exemption Statutes-Revision Ideas, 36 WASH L. REV. 484, 485 (1961):

Vukowich. Debtors*Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 784-86 (1974).
16. See R. WAPLES, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION 3-4 (1893):

The conservation of family homes is the purpose of homestead legislation. The policy of the state
is to foster families as the factors of society, and thus promote the general welfare.
Families are the units of society, indispensible factors of civilization, the bases of the commonwealth. Upon their permanency, in any community, depends the success of schools, churches, public
libraries, and good institutions of every kind. The sentiments of patriotism and independence, the spirit
of free citizenship, the feeling of interest in public affairs, are cultivated and fostered more readily when
the citizen lives permanently in his own castle with a sense of its protection and durability.
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one of protecting the overextended debtor and his family from penury. 7 In
statutes exempting the debtor's furniture or provisions one finds the humanitarian idea that there was a minimal level of debtor existence or maintenance
that, as a matter of social conscience, was more important to preserve than
was the creditor's ability to collect debts rightfully due. 8 Debtors' exemption
laws, conceived in this early nineteenth century atmosphere of humanitarian
reform, for the most part remained unchanged in content and purpose until
the middle of the twentieth century.' 9
Exemptions within the law of bankruptcy reflect comparable and contemporaneous conceptual development. Bankruptcy began in this country as
a mechanism for creditor relief, the focus of which was the orderly liquidation
and distribution of a debtor's assets to his creditors. 20 The limited exemptions
found in early acts were created by necessity and historical inertia.
Congress patterned our first Bankruptcy Act,2 ' passed in 1800, after its
English counterpart 2 and excepted from distribution to creditors necessary
apparel and bedding. 23 The Act also provided a premium of three to ten
percent of the estate to the complying debtor up to a maximum of eight
hundred dollars, and the percentage exempted rose with the percentage that
creditors were paid on their claims.2 This cash exemption, like the bankruptcy discharge 2 5 appears originally designed as an incentive for the debtor to
gather for creditors the largest estate possible. The mechanism made creditor
returns the focal point in determining the amount exempted.
Before long, the humanitarian ideas reflected in nineteenth century debtors' exemptions found their way into bankruptcy exemptions. The exemption provisions of the 1841 Bankruptcy Act 26 manifest a shift in purpose from
generating a larger estate for creditors to providing the debtor with minimal
maintenance; that shift, in turn, parallels the shift in bankruptcy from a creditor to a debtor orientation over the same period of time.2 7 The 1841 Act
"excepted" from distribution family apparel, household and kitchen furniture, and "necessaries" up to three hundred dollars in value. This shifted
17. Kennedy, Limitations of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IOWA L. REV. 445, 447-48 (1960); Note,
Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 1800?, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 665 (1968).
18. Cf. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 100 (1926) (on the prohibition of usury,

considered to be both a sin and a crime in earliest times).
19. See Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355, 356 (1959).
20. Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a FresherStart, 58 N.C.L. REV. 723, 724 (1980).

21. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 5, 2 Stat. 19, 23 (1800). Copies of the texts of all American bankruptcy
acts from Statutes at Large are conveniently located at the Supplemental Appendix, Part I, of Bankruptcy Act
Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. (1975-76) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
22. For a history ofearly bankruptcy laws in England, see 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 229 (1926).
23. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 5, 2 Stat. 19, 23 (1800).
24. Id. §§ 34, 35, 2 Stat. 30, 31. The larger the percentage that creditors were paid on their claims, the larger
the exempted percentage became. Id.
25. See J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 100, at 88 (1956).
26. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841).
27. See generally C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY chs. I & 11 (1935).
28. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (1841).
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focus to "necessaries" suggests that the requirements of the debtor and his
family had supplanted creditor returns as a central inquiry in determining how
much property was exempt. The shift in focus from the creditors to the debtor
suggests a parallel shift in the perceived role of exemptions in bankruptcy-a
shift from their role as an incentive to a role similar to that served by contemporaneous state debtors' exemptions.
The debtor, his family, and their needs were again the focus of the exemption provisions of the 1867 Bankruptcy Act.29 That Act, for the first time,
incorporated state exemption provisions into its operation. The statute exempted household furniture and "necessaries" up to five hundred dollars,
family apparel, military arms, uniforms and equipment, and "any such other
property... as is excepted from levy and sale upon execution or other process ...

by the laws of the state in which the bankrupt has domicile at the

time of the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy . ,..0
The
effect was a federal minimum amount of property left to the bankrupt; the
maximum was left to state legislation. Incorporation of state exemptions into
bankruptcy was natural and understandable in view of the similarity in purpose of exemption provisions in the two systems.
The 1898 Bankruptcy Act produced complete identity of exemptions in
and out of bankruptcy. Section 6 of that Act looked entirely to state law and
federal law apart from the Act to determine that property which would be left
to the bankrupt after bankruptcy proceedings were concluded. 3 Because
similar humanitarian purposes-debtor and family maintenance and protection from destitution-were behind exemption provisions both in and out of
bankruptcy, it was inoffensive from a policy standpoint that the provisions be
the same and be determined locally. Moreover, because the 1898 Act used
state law to decide a variety of related questions,3 3 a certain symmetry resulted from the use of debtors' exemptions in bankruptcy: with minor exceptions,
debtors and creditors theoretically got the same shares of the pie whether the
debtor was in bankruptcy or not. In retrospect it appears that the legislative
union of exemptions in and out of bankruptcy through the 1898 Act, while
sensible at the time, tended to obscure recognition that the purposes of exemptions in and out of bankruptcy might change over time. That union may
thereby have hindered any independent development of exemptions in response to changing needs or purposes of bankruptcy law.
B. History-Growing Disparity

Several twentieth century developments subjected the 1898 Bankruptcy
Act's exemption scheme to increasing stress. The first was the relative growth
29. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867).
30. Id. § 14, 14 Stat. 522-23.

31. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
32. Id. § 6, 30 Stat. 548.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 136-43.
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and crystallization of the fresh start for the debtor as a central consideration in
bankruptcy, and the use of that notion in judicial decisionmaking. The perception that bankruptcy liquidation might serve as a debtor relief mechanism and
might, through the fresh start, restore a debtor's productive energies was
gradual in its development.
Giving the debtor relief from debt was initially an incidental benefit of the
discharge, originally designed to induce the debtor to gather honestly all
assets. 34 But even as early as 1799, a conceptual association between the
bankruptcy process and the restoration of the productive energies of debtors
was being made in Congress.35 The recognition of debtor rehabilitation as one
objective of bankruptcy appears in judicial decisions in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, 36 but as late as 1910 the "primary object" continued to be
perceived as distribution of the debtor's 37property, the discharge and fresh
start being "incidental and subordinate.,
It is, of course, impossible to determine when the fresh start idea actually
began influencing decision makers with any regularity. It appears that the
influence of the idea was well underway by the time of the 1934 Supreme
Court decision in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt3 8 in which the Court explicitly
recognized the fresh start as "one of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy
Act.", 39 The idea's comparatively recent ascendency as a central purpose of
bankruptcy has signalled a further movement of bankruptcy from its early
nineteenth century creditor relief origins to its late twentieth century conception as a mechanism for debtor relief and revitalization. 4°
Exempt property, being the bulk of the property with which the debtor
emerged from bankruptcy, formed part of the foundation on which the debtor
could begin a new f'mancial life. But while the perceived importance of the
fresh start was growing, state exemption provisions that were applicable in
bankruptcy and that might have accommodated that growth were not changing. Bridging the widening gap between perceived policy goals and applicable
legislation, a number of courts understandably enhanced the debtor's grub34. J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 100, at 88 (1956).
35. C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 16-17 (1935).

36. E.g., In re Muller, 17 F. Cas. 974-75 (D. Or. 1869) (No. 9912); Silverman's Case, 22 F. Cas. 134 (D. Or.

1870) (No. 12,855).
37. In re Swoffard Bros. Dry Goods Co., 180 F. 549, 556 (W.D. Mo. 1910). See also Burlingham v. Crouse,
228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913); In re Mumford, 255 F. 108, 117 (E.D. N.C. 1919).
38. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
39. Id. at 244. Cf. Gilbert v. Shouse, 61 F.2d 398,399 (5th Cir. 1932) ("The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act

is twofold, i.e., to permit an honest debtor to start afresh, relieved from his burden of indebtedness, and to
distribute his assets equitably among his creditors. The act must be reasonably construed to effect both
objects." (citations omitted)).
40. See Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge:Toward a FresherStart, 58 N.C.L. REV. 723,724 (1980).

The use of "revitalization" instead of the more common "rehabilitation" is for purposes of clarity. TIle
theoretical underpinnings of the fresh start include the rekindling of the debtor's productive energy following the
removing of oppressive debt. See J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 100 (1956). "Rehabilitation" often is used
to express that process, but it also is used to express the distinct process of assisting the debtor to repay debts
due and owing, most commonly through chapter 13 of the Code. Confusion can result from mixing these
different uses of "rehabilitation." Cf. Schuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy ofBankruptcy, " 21 U.C.L.A.

L. REV. 403, 417 (1973). Use of "revitalization" here will avoid that confusion.
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stake not by finding property exempt under state law, but rather, by manipulating the 41more fluid property of the estate concept in a way to achieve the
same goal.
A related factor that placed the 1898 Act's exemption provisions under
stress was the large increase in consumer debt and in consumer bankruptcies
following World War II.42 This development focused increased attention on
the problems of consumer bankruptcies, and with that came further attention
to the fresh start. Only after World War II did property left to an individual
following bankruptcy become generally discussed as a vital consideration in
advancing a fresh start policy. 43 This increased attention brought into view
the obsolescence and irrelevance of some state debtors' exemption laws,
many of which had not been revised for over a century.44 The obsolescence of
some state exemption statutes4 5 and the extreme diversity in the fresh starts
obtainable in, for example, Maryland and Texas6 under the 1898 Act produced a current in the bankruptcy reform movement for uniform, federal
exemptions to be provided within the Bankruptcy Act itself.47
State exemptions, suitable for advancing the humanitarian goals of exemptions in and out of bankruptcy in 1898, had thus become potentially
unsuited to advancing the fresh start goals of modem bankruptcy. The perceived reasons behind exemptions in bankruptcy had changed while the provisions themselves, largely unchanged state exemptions designed to advance
goals different from the bankruptcy fresh start, had not. With the addition of a

41. The fresh start objective motivated several courts to constrict the Act's definition of "property" to
exclude-and thereby preserve for the debtor-things of value such as rights to accrued vacation pay, which
otherwise would have been distributed to creditors. See Lee, Leading CaseCommentary, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J.
115, 118-19 (1971); Comment, Protection of a Debtor's "Fresh Start" Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 29
CATH. U.L. REV. 843, 849-50 (1980).
42. In 1946, 10,196 bankruptcy cases were filed; in 1967, 208,329 cases were filed, and in between, filings
increased almost continuously. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 18
(1971). The increase is due largely to the increase in consumer filings, five in six in 1946, more than eleven in
twelve by 1971. Id. at 20. See also H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 116-17, reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6076-77 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OFTHE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I,
at 2-3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
43. See Countryman, Fora New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 678, 684 (1960);
Note, supra note 12, at 1462. The Court in Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913), appeared to
recognize exemptions as a component of the fresh start.
44. See Countryman, supra note 43, at 681-84; Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization,
34 IND. L.J. 355, 355-56 (1955); Note, supra note 12, at 1465-68.
45. Specific examples included spinning wheels, horses, and mules, as well as unrealistic limits on value
such as Indiana's $700 homestead exemption. Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34
IND. L.J. 355, 356, 364 (1959).
Virginia, an opt-out state that presumably has reviewed its exemption legislation recently, currently includes in its list of exemptions 25 bushels of rye or buckwheat, two hoes, one barrel of flour, two basins, one
pot, and "one pair of cards." VA. CODE § 34-26(5) (Supp. 1982).
46. In 1960 Maryland's exemption provisions were said to be worth about $300 to a debtor, while those of
Texas, if cleverly used, could net a debtor in excess of $100,000. Countryman, supra note 43, at 681-82.
47. Id. at 746; D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 81-82 (1971);
Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions:A FullCircleBack to the Act of 1800?, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 663,666-68 (1968);
Note, supra note 12, at 1508. But see Kennedy, supra note 17, at 446.
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rising number of consumer bankruptcies, for which the fresh start was most
important, the time was ripe for reform.
C. Bankruptcy Reform-Recognized Disparity
In 1970 Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States,48 whose mission it was to study and recommend changes in the
bankruptcy law. The rise in consumer bankruptcies and the development of
the fresh start idea had proceeded sufficiently that by 1970 the fresh start for
and revitalization of consumer debtors appeared as a major theme. 49 The
fresh start had developed into perhaps the dominant purpose for bankruptcy,5 and exemptions in bankruptcy were now recognized by the Commission5 ' and reformers52 as central to the revitalization process that the fresh
start idea represented. The Commission's approach was a set of uniform,
federal exemptions in bankruptcy 53 "to eliminate diversity, reduce the
amount of litigation having no direct relationship to the policy underlying
exemptions, and because state exemption laws seem generally archaic and
unduly generous in some states and exceedingly niggardly, particularly as to
urban residents in others." 54
As one commentator 55 recognized early, however, any attempt to make
uniform a body of law so diverse as debtors' exemptions would meet with
substantial opposition from both sides of any proposed compromise. Moreover, the 1898 Act's incorporation of state debtors' exemptions in bankruptcy
had produced a perceived general uniformity within a given state of the property that could be held free of creditor claims whether in bankruptcy or out. 56
This fueled another argument unavailable under previous bankruptcy statutes: increasing the exemptions in bankruptcy over those available in a given
state, it was said, would induce debtors to elect bankruptcy to keep more
property; decreasing them under a state's counterparts would induce creditors to file involuntary petitions so they might get more property.57 In short,
any disparity in exemptions in and out of bankruptcy would create in someone
an incentive to file bankruptcy petitions.
The Senate was apparently unpersuaded by the arguments voiced by the
Commission and others against the old system. Its final bill, 58 to be reconciled
48. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, § 1, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
49. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 42, pt. I, at 71.
50. House Hearings, supra note 21, at 180.
51. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 42, pt. I, at 169-70.
52. See, e.g., House Hearings,supra note 21, at 369 (statement of Marjorie Girth and David Stanley);
Countryman, supra note 43, at 684; Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: State Law or FederalPolicy?, 35 U.
PITT. L. REV. 630, 630 (1974); Note, supra note 12, at 1503.
53. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 42, pt. 1I,§ 4-503, at 125-27.

54. Id. at 127.
55. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 452.
56. This perception was not accurate in all respects. See infra text accompanying notes 136-43.
57. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 452. The fresh start idea was so important and the incentive argument so

persuasive that one solution proposed (but not adopted) was federally legislated exemptions for use outside
bankruptcy also. See House Hearings, supra note 21, at 193 (remarks of Professor Kennedy).
58. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 522 (1977).
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with the House version,59 like the 1898 Act gave the debtor the exemptions

provided by the state of his domicile along with other exemptions to which the
debtor would be entitled under federal law outside the bankruptcy law. The
House version also did not adopt the Commission's recommendation that
exemptions in bankruptcy be set entirely by the bankruptcy legislation. Instead, in an apparent compromise directed at the states with "unduly generous" exemptions, the House bill established a set of federal exemptions for
use in bankruptcy, but permitted a debtor to choose the exemptions of the
state of his or her domicile if desired.*6 Like the 1867 bankruptcy legislation,
the effect of the House bill was to establish a federal minimum of exempted
property for debtors to6retain after bankruptcy and to let the individual states
control the maximum. 1
The opt-out provision permitting states to deprive debtors in their
states of the choice among exemption provisions that the House bill had
provided was the vehicle that reconciled these fundamental differences in the
House and Senate versions of the Bankruptcy Code's basic exemption provision.63 By including that provision, Congress permitted individual states to
determine by suitable legislation a vital component of the fresh start with
which domiciled debtors would emerge from bankruptcy. 64 It is not surpris-

59. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
60. Id. § 522. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 126-27, 360-63. The effect, of course, would be that
debtors in "unduly generous" states could have the benefit of their states' generosity.
61. The House legislation was different from the 1867 Act in that under the House bill, a debtor got either
the listed exemptions or whatever his state provided, but not both. The 1867 Act permitted a debtor to take both
federal bankruptcy and state law exemptions. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, § 14, 14 Stat. 522-23 (1867).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1980). It reads in full as follows:
(b) Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of the
estate either(1)property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law that is
applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) ofthis subsection specifically does not so authorize; or,
in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or
State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in which the
debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the
petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place; and
(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement ofthe
case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety orjoint tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by
the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
63. 124 CONG. REC. 32,398 (statement by Congressman Don Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6452-53; 124 CONG. REC. 33,998 (statement by Sen. DeConcini), reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6521.
64. In In re Sullivan, No. 81-1921 (7th Cir. May 19, 1982), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the constitutionality of the Code's opt-out provision based primarily on its conclusions about the
congressional intent behind the opt-out compromise. In controversy was the Illinois opt-out, which provided
nonhomeowners nothing comparable to the homestead exemption supplied to homeowners under Illinois exemption law and to everyone under the federal bankruptcy exemptions.
The court correctly observed that the opt-out provision was a compromise to resolve differences between a
Senate bill that, without apparent limitation, incorporated state exemptions as the 1898 Act had done and a
House version that set federal minimum exemptions for all states to ensure a fresh start. The court stated:
We find from this history that the intention of providing a "fresh start" can be attributed only to the
House. A resolve to let states determine the applicable exemptions must be attributed to the Senate.
Congress did not resolve this difference. It settled on a "compromise" which in some cases may thwart
the underlying purpose of the House. This court cannot seize upon the motivation of the House as
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ing, therefore, that the compromise has been condemned as undercutting a
basic reform thrust-uniformity-of the Bankruptcy Code. 6'
D. State Legislative Responses

The bankruptcy reform movement and the opt-out provision have sparked an interest in exemptions at the state level that is unprecedented in this
century. Thirty-two states thus far have enacted legislation depriving debtors
in their states of the choice of exemptions provided in the Bankruptcy Code.6
Most states simply confined debtors in bankruptcy to the exemptions available
to other debtors under state law. 67
Nearly all states that have opted out have, however, made changes in
their debtors' exemption laws.6s Some extensively rewrote their law of debtrepresentative of the entire Congress when the enacted legislation clearly warrants a contrary conclusion.
Id., slip op. at 10.
The court's statement of legislative intent isunfortunate. While it is reasonably clear that the Senate did not
favor a federally defined fresh start through mandatory federal bankruptcy exemptions, it clearly did recognize
the fresh start role exemptions play in bankruptcy. Its report on S. 2266 discussed exemptions as follows:
Current law is retained in the area of exempt property which is property that the debtor may retain
after bankruptcy for a fresh start. For this purpose, current law adopts the exemption law of the state in
which the debtor is a resident.... The Committee feels that the policy of the bankruptcy law is to
provide a fresh start but not instant affluence, as would be possible under the provisions of H.R. 8200.
Moreover, current law has allowed the several state legislatures flexibility to meet the needs and
fresh-start requirements of the debtors of their particular states.
S. REP. NO. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5792.
Like the House, the Senate intended to provide a fresh start to debtors and recognized the role exemptions
played in the fresh start. The major difference from the House approach concerned who would decide the
exemptions necessary for a fresh start. In contrast with the House approach, the Senate initially chose to defer
entirely to state legislatures to determine the exemption provisions that would provide a fresh start.
65. See, e.g., Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REV.
769, 801-04 (1980); Comment, Protection of a Debtor's "Fresh Start" Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 29
CATH. U. L. REV. 843, 864-66 (1980). Cf. authorities cited supra notes 15-34.
66. See ALA. CODE § 6-10-11 (Supp. 1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1133 (Supp. 1981); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 36-210 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-107 (Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 4914 (Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN § 222.20 (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1601 (Supp. 1981);
IDAHO CODE § 11-609 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-2-28-0.5 (Bums Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.10 (West 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2312 (Supp.
1981); KY. REV. STAT. § 427.170 (Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881(B) (Vest Supp. 1982); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4425 (Supp. 1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-504(g) (Supp. 1981);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-2-106 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-15,-l05 (Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 21.090(3) (1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511:2-a (Supp. 1981); Act of June 2, 1981, ch. 490, § 1, 1981 N.C.
Adv. Legis. Serv. No. 6 at 20 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § IC-1601(f)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-17
(Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.662 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § I(B) (Vest Supp.
1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 23.305 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-425 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981); S.D. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 43-45-13 (Supp. 198 1); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-112 (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-15
(Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 38-10-4 (Supp. 1982); WYO. STAT. § 1-20-109
(Supp. 1982). In addition, California has used its opt-out authority to restrict California debtors to the same
exemption provisions (either state or federal) in a joint case. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690(b) (West Supp.
1981). It is unclear whether opt-out authority can be used in this way. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (1980).
Illinois and Tennessee have since had their opt-out statutes invalidated as in conflict with § 522 of the Code
and therefore void under the supremacy clause of the Constitution. Bradshaw v. Beneficial Fin. Co. (In re
Balgemann), 16 Bankr. 780 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1982); Rhodes v. Stewart (In re Rhodes), 14 Bankr. 629 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1981). Illinois' opt-out was subsequently resurrected by the Seventh Circuit in In re Sullivan, No.
81-1921 (7th Cir. May 19, 1982). These cases are discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 237-44.
67. Notable exceptions include Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, North Dakota, Iowa, Ohio, and West
Virginia. See infra text accompanying notes 193-229.
68. The focal point here is on personal property exemptions.
Wage garnishment, which diverts part of a debtor's income to creditors as it accrues, is restricted by the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1671, and by a number of states as well, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
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ors' exemptions. 69 Others increased dollar limits within their present exemption statutes.70 Most legislatures continued their old format7' in twentieth
century terms and appear to have traded an updated set of exemptions for
opting out of the Bankruptcy Code. While no distinct substantive trend
emerges from the exemption legislation now applicable to debtors in opt-out
states, the pattern suggests a prevalent legislative attempt to restrict debtors
in bankruptcy to the exemption provisions available to all other debtors outside bankruptcy. The pattern of opting out and the legislation designed to
effect an opt-out suggest generally inadequate legislative sensitivity to changes in the functioning of and policy behind exemptions for use in bankruptcy
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. We will consider first some specifics of
the state opt-out legislation that may be troublesome and then consider
broader questions that might be addressed in considering or reconsidering
opt-out legislation.
III. OPT-OuTs: STATE EXEMPTIONS WITHIN THE BANKRuPTCY CODE
Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act gives the debtor a choice of
exempting property specified within that section or of exempting property
protected by federal nonbankruptcy law or state or local law "unless the State
law that is applicable to the debtor... specifically does not so authorize." 72
While the Code thus calls for specific state legislation to effect an opt-out, a
simple, one sentence statement of intent to preclude state debtors from using
the Code's federal bankruptcy exemptions suffices. 73 This insignificant legislative effort can produce far reaching effects. The result of that state legislation is an opt-out that not only deprives a debtor of the federal provisions, but
replaces the Code's exemptions with whatever state exemptions the state
happens to have. All opt-out states have made clear their intent to deprive
domiciled debtors of the federal bankruptcy exemptions. As will be discussed,
much of the state legislation has, however, failed to take into account
ANN. § 8127 (Purdon 1981). These are among the most important forms of exemptions for consumer debtors
outside bankruptcy. See generally S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS, REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION
341-43 (3d ed. 1979). Such statutes are, however, of little importance as exemptions in bankruptcy because the
bankruptcy discharge ends the liability for which future wages might be diverted. Accordingly, our discussion of
the use of state exemptions in bankruptcy will focus primarily on exemptions that extend to types of personal
property currently considered as subject to current valuation, liquidation, and distribution to creditors in
satisfaction of debt.
69. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1123 (Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 561.16, 627.6 (West Supp.
1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66 (Page Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 1, 2 (West Supp.
1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-102 (1980).
70. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-10-1 (Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-101 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, §§
1, 13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); IND. CODE § 34-2-28-I (Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1552, 40-101
(Supp. 1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511:2 (Supp. 1981); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §43-45-3(2) (Supp. 1981);
VA. CODE 88 34-4, 34-26 (Supp. 1982). At least one state imposed dollar limitations when none existed earlier.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-371 (Supp. 1981).
71. There are three general formats within which most debtor exemption legislation can be described: the
crystallized format in which specific items are enumerated within the legislation, the open designation format in
which categories are specified such as "'necessary farm implements," and what might be called a value format in
which the legislature specifies the amount and the debtor selects those items of importance to him. See generally
Joslin, Debtors' Eremptions Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355, 356-60 (1955).
72. 1 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1980). See supra note 62 for the full text of Code section 522(b).
73. See, e.g., the state statute quoted infra in note 75.
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basic changes the Code made in the way state exemptions operate in bankruptcy. Much of the blame lies with Congress for failing to consider and deal
with difficult questions of the interaction of state and federal law in the exemption provisions, 74 or for making it so easy to opt out that the legislative
process does not itself require a state legislature to consider the implications.
On the other hand, opt-out state legislatures might have eliminated many of
these problems. Most have failed to do so.
The operative state opt-out provisions fall roughly into two formats. The
denial format is found in those states that have simply said that debtors in
bankruptcy in their states may not use the exemption provisions of Code
section 522(d). 75 The replacement format goes a small step further by denying
debtors the federal provisions and granting those exemptions as permitted by
"the laws" of the opt-out state.76 A variation of the replacement format
combines the denial of the federal provisions with the specification that bankrupt debtors are to enjoy only those exemptions found in the state's statutes
or constitution. 7
The apparent intent in most states under all three rubrics is that debtors
who elect bankruptcy are to retain the same property as those hypothetical
state debtors78 who refrain from filing a bankruptcy petition, sit on their
exemptions, and are subjected to an exhaustive creditor collection process
instead.79 While there may be questions about the wisdom of seeking parity of

exemptions in and out of bankruptcy,8° the state legislation as written may

74. On problems with the interaction of state and federal law in the exemption area, see Stem, State
Exemption Law in Bankruptcy: The Excepted Creditor as a Medium for Appraising Aspects of Bankruptcy
Reform, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 70 (1980); Hertz, Bankruptcy Code Exemptions: Notes on the Effect of State
Law, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 339, 354 (1980). See also infra text accompanying notes 81-160.
75. The Kansas provision is typical in providing that "[n]o person, as an individual debtor under the federal
bankruptcy reform act of 1978 [sic] (II U.S.C.A. § I01 et seq.), may elect exemptions pursuant to subsection
(b)(1) of section 522 of such federal act." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2312 (Supp. 1981). Other states in this category
include Maryland (MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-509(g) (Supp. 1981)) and Wyoming (WYO. STAT.
§ 1-20-109 (Supp. 1982)). Compare Maine's approach, which permits debtors in bankruptcy only those exemptions permitted under Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(2)(A)-(B). ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §4425 (Supp. 1981).
76. Illinois is an example of a state following this approach. Its provision reads:
In accordance with the provision of Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C. 522(b))
residents of this state shall be prohibited from using the federal exemptions provided in Section 522(d)
of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. 522(d)) except as may otherwise be permitted under the laws of
Illinois.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981). Other states with this approach include Alabama
(ALA. CODE § 6-10-11 (Supp. 1981)), Indiana (IND. CODE §34-2-28-0.5 (Bums Supp. 1982)), and Louisiana (LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881(B) (West Supp. 1982)).
77. Legislation in this category includes that of Florida (FLA. STAT. § 222.20 (Supp. 1982)), Nebraska
(NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-15,-105 (Supp. 1981)), New Hamphire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511:2-a (Supp.
1981)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1(B) (West Supp. 1981)), South Dakota (S.D. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 43-45-13 (Supp. 1981)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-112 (Supp. 1980), and Virginia (VA. CODE
§ 34-3.1 (Supp. 1982)).
78. Because of the high costs of the coercive collection system on the one hand (see Leff, Injury, Ignorance, and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1970)), and waiver of exemptions
through the recognition of security interests in exempt property on the other (see Haines, Security Interests in
Exempt Personalty: Toward Safeguarding Basic Exempt Necessities, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 215, 215-34
(1981)), the hypothetical debtors described in the text may be extremely rare.
79. This is not the intent in those states giving debtors in bankruptcy special state law treatment. See infra
text accompanying notes 215-29.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 199-214.
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result in a serious disparity in the property retained by some debtors following
bankruptcy. At a minimum, the legislation presents interpretation problems
that might easily be avoided by recognizing basic changes effected by the
Code in the interaction of state and federal law in the exemption area.
A. The Failureof State Legislative Expression
The potential disparity in treatment of debtors in and out of bankruptcy
despite identical exemptions arises out of the immunity from creditor process
that most states grant to certain interests of debtors that are not specified in
exemption statutes nor thought of as exempt property. Common examples of
82
8
these interests include the tenancy by the entirety, ' the right to a pension,
the right to alimony and child support,8 3 the spendthrift trust, 84 and the cause
of action for personal injury.85 Because such interests were "not property"
or "not transferable," 87 common-law courts generally protected such debtor
interests from the reaches of creditors.
The 1898 Bankruptcy Act, which looked entirely to state law for the
content of exemptions in bankruptcy, also recognized those de facto exemptions through its definition of "property of the estate." That Act defined
"property of the estate" in terms of its transferability or leviability under
state law.8 9 Most de facto exemptions, 90 therefore, operated in bankruptcy as
they did outside bankruptcy under state law-property that was not transferable or leviable never passed to the trustee and was thereby reserved to the
debtor.
De facto exemptions no longer play the same role now that they did under
the 1898 Act. This is because property of the estate under the current Code is
no longer defined by the tests of common-law transferability and leviability
used under the 1898 Act.9 ' Now, with narrow exceptions, 92 all "legal or
81. See generally S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS, REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 310 (3d ed.

1979).
82. See, e.g., In re Goodwin, 57 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1932) (Ohio).
83. See, e.g., In re Le Claire, 124 F. 654, 656-58 (N.D. Iowa 1903).
84. See, e.g., First N.W. Trust Co. v. IRS, 622 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1980).

85. See, e.g., Cesner v. Schmelzer (In re Schmelzer), 480 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973) (Ohio); In re Anderson,
345 F. Supp. 840 (E.D. Tenn. 1972). See S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 229 (3d ed. 1979); Plumb, The Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt
and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REV. 1, 43-47 (1975); Annot., 66 A.L.R. 2D 1217 (1959).
86. See Note, supra note 12, at 1478.
87. See, e.g., Voltz v. Goodwin (In re Goodwin), 57 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1932); In re Le Claire, 124 F. 654,
656-58 (N.D. Iowa 1903); Haines v. Public Fin. Corp., 7 Ohio App. 2d 89, 218 N.E.2d 727 (1966) (right of action

for invasion of privacy).
88. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (1898) (repealed Oct. 1, 1979, Bankruptcy
Reform
89.
Reform
90.

Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1979)).
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a)(5), 30 Stat. 544,566 (1898) (repealed Oct. I, 1979, Bankruptcy
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1979)).
Not all de facto exemptions operated in bankruptcy under the 1898 Act, however. Since § 70(a)(5)

defined property of the estate to include interests that were either leviable or transferable under state law,
certain interests that were transferable but that could not be reached by creditors (nonleviable) came into the
estate. Examples included memberships on stock exchanges and the equity of redemption. See generally Note,
supra note 12, at 1478-79.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1980). See generally 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 541.02 (L. King ed. 15th ed.

1981).
92. The major exception is the spendthrift trust. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1980).
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equitable interests of the debtor in property" become part of the estate and,
while neither "interest" nor "property" is defined in the Code, the congressional intent was clearly to bring into the estate anything of value the debtor
had. 9 The federal exemptions contained in section 522(d) give some indication of the breadth of the new property of the estate concept. In that section
are provisions exempting from property of the estate limited interests in alimony, support and separate maintenance, 94 the right to pension benefits, 95 the
97
96
right to receive compensation on account of personal injury, and others.
The new Code format thus frees the question of what comes into the
estate from the vagaries and variations of state law and, instead, utilizes a
very broad federal standard to include in the estate both exempt and nonexempt property as well as property necessary for a fresh start formerly
reserved to the debtor by judicial decision under the old law. 93 The impact of
the change is, in part, that courts may be much more restricted in their ability
to use state property law or bankruptcy notions of fresh start to immunize
property for the debtor on a case by case basis. 99 By restricting courts' use of
these vague and inherently flexible concepts, Congress arguably has injected
more certainty into the delineation of exempt property because it has moved
considerable responsibility for that delineation from the judicial to the legislative branch. An implication of decreased judicial flexibility is that legislative
policymaking and drafting in the exemption area is much more important than
it was under the 1898 Act-courts no longer have the judicial tools they once
had to fill legislative gaps in the law.'°
Problems are to be expected concerning those interests now included in
bankruptcy's "property of the estate" for which state law has created common-law immunities. Because state common law immunized those interests
from creditor process, it was superfluous in the past for a state legislature to include provisions protecting such interests in its exemption statutes. Trustees,
of course, will use the expanded property of the estate definition in a creatively expansive way to attempt to reach interests in property not generally
93. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 175-76.
94. If U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(D) (1980).
95. Id. § 522(d)(10)(E).
96. Id. § 522(d)(1I)(D)-(E).
97. E.g., the right to a disability, illness, or unemployment benefit (id. § 522(d)(I)(C)), and the right to an
award under a crime victim's reparation law (id. § 522(d)(I 1)(A)).
98. S. REP. NO. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787,
5868.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
100. It has been suggested that, given the last-minute nature ofthe opt-out compromise in Congress and the
incompatability of some state exemption provisions with the expanded definition of property of the estate,
courts should continue to have the flexibility they had under the Act to exclude various interests in property
from the bankruptcy estate. Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 953, 972 n.60
(1981). While the approach is plausible for reconciling many of the problems produced by the opt-out compromise, it seems dubious, given the present volume of case law and commentary on the expansive nature of §541,
that the section will be narrowed judicially to permit this flexibility. Moreover, the lack of bankruptcy jurisdiction over such exempt property could set the stage for a resurfacing of the Lockwood v. Exchange Bank
doctrine, which the Code was structured to avoid. See infra text accompanying notes 136-59.
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° Litigation is likely, therefore,
thought reachable under state law.'O
to center
on the exempt or nonexempt status of such items of property. The cause of
action for personal injuries, the subject of special attention in the Chandler
Act Amendments of 1938,102 clearly will be an item prompting recurring disputes and can illustrate the problems most opt-out provisions have precipitated. 10 3
Most state law has, in effect, immunized from the claims of creditors a
debtor's unliquidated claims for damages for personal injuries. '°4 Under the
1898 Bankruptcy Act this meant that those claims did not vest in the trustee, 105 and, following bankruptcy, the debtor was free to prosecute the claims
and retain the resulting judgments. The result was not achieved by reference to
state exemption statutes but, rather, by reference to the reachability of that
cause of action under applicable state process. At times the courts justified
their construction of the applicable state law by reference to bankruptcy
policy,'06 the driving force of which is vividly expressed by the court in
Cesner v. Schmelzer (In re Schmelzer):0 7

[The] goals of the Bankruptcy Act can hardly be achieved if the trustee is
permitted to take over the bankrupt's unliquidated claims for serious personal
injuries including claims for future pain and suffering, continued disability, and

101. The insatiablity and creativity of the trustee have a long history. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Keeley, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 213 (1793), in which an early assignee claimed he was vested with the debtor's deceit action that
accrued prior to the assignment.
102. The Chandler Act, ch. 575,52 Stat. 840 (1938), added the proviso in the Act's § 70(a)(5) that read:
Provided, That rights of action ex delicto for libel, slander, injuries to the person of the bankrupt or
of a relative whether or not resulting in death, seduction, and criminal conversation shall not vest in the
trustee unless by the law of the State such rights of action are subject to attachment, execution,
garnishment, or other judicial process.
Id. at 880. The changes were said to be declaratory of existing law, added for clarification. H.R. REP. NO. 1409,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1,34 (1937), reprintedin House Hearings,supra note 21, Supplemental Appendix, part I,
at 674, 707.
103. Congress eliminated two other major sources of potential problems by making the status of the
spendthrift trust and the tenancy by the entirety turn on applicable state law. Section 541(c)(2) protects the
beneficial interest of the debtor in a spendthrift trust in accordance with state law by providing that "[a]
restriction in the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable
nonbankrupcty law is enforceable in a case under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1980) (emphasis added).
If state exemption provisions are applicable either through debtor election or a state's opt-out, the debtor's
interest in a tenancy by the entirety is protected to the extent protected under state law. In addition to property
exempt under state law applied through § 522(b)(2)(A), a debtor using state exemptions in bankruptcy may
exempt
any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the commencement of the case, an
interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the
entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy laws.
II U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B) (1980) (emphasis added).
104. See, e.g., Cesner v. Schmelzer (In re Schmelzer), 480 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973) (Ohio); In re Anderson,
345 F. Supp. 840 (E.D. Tenn. 1972). See also S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS'
PROTECTION 229 (3d ed. 1979); Plumb, The Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy LawsExempt and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REV. 1, 43-47 (1975); Annot., 66 A.L.R. 2D. 1217 (1959).
105. Bankrupcty Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(a)(5), 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
106. See, e.g., Cesner v. Schmelzer (In re Schmelzer), 480 F.2d 1074, 1077 (6th Cir. 1973) (Ohio); Hayes v.
Buda (In re Buda), 323 F.2d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 1963) (Wisconsin).
107. 480 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973).
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loss of earnings in the future. It seems almost against public policy to permit the
trustee in bankruptcy to prosecute such as [sic] action in his own name. 103

While bankruptcy policy may continue to justify protecting at least parts
of the debtor's personal injury claim,'0 9 it is reasonably clear that the personal
injury claim no longer remains outside the estate under the expanded definition of property of the estate in the Code." 0 In many opt-out states creditors in
bankruptcy might therefore obtain distributions of the value of the plaintiff's
personal injury claim, which they are unable to reach outside bankruptcy.
Under the Code, unless that claim is held to be "exempt under ... State or
local law,""' such a result, at least in larger personal injury claims, seems
inevitable.
A court in that situation will be called on to decide what meaning to
attach to "exempt under ... State or local law" when state law supplies no
statutory exemption but instead uses common-law principles to protect the
debtor's personal injury claim from creditors outside bankruptcy. Does the
common-law immunity of the debtor's personal injury claim qualify as exempt
for purposes of section 522(b)(2)(A)? The answer is far from clear.
One might logically begin a search for the answer with the Code's legislative history. Congress could have intended that section 522(b)(2)(A) be read
expansively to include state common-law immunities. The evidence, however, is to the contrary.
The Senate bill, which contained no federal exemptions, 2 referred to
"State or local law" and was said to "track current law.""113 The few courts
that considered the meaning of "exemption" under predecessor section 6 of
the 1898 Act" 4 rejected an interpretation that would equate "exempt" with
"immune under state law." 1,5 Under the broadest interpretation, the inquiry
108. Id. at 1077. Cf. Hayes v. Buda (In re Buda), 323 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1963): "[1]t is not... the policy of

the law to take from a wrongfully injured person the compensation for his injury to satisfy his creditors in a
bankruptcy proceeding." Id. at 750 (citing Sihley v. Nason, 196 Mass. 125, 81 N.E. 887 (1907)).
109. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(l1)(D)-(E) (1980). Cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-5(9) (Supp. 1981);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § IA(19) (West Supp. 1981).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 91-100.
111. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1980). Several opt-out states have recognized the expansive nature of the
Code's property of the estate and have enacted exemptions to encompass the personal injury claim that will

eliminate this problem in bankruptcy. Most have patterned their exemption of such interests on Code
§ 522(d)(l 1), 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1 1)(1980). See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 36-211 (Supp. 1981); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 427.150(2) (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-03.1 (Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 23.160(j)(B) (1981).

There are, however, variants. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-102(n) (Supp. 1981) (personal injury award
proceeds exempt "except for obligations incurred for treatment of any kind"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31,
§ IA(19) (West Supp. 1981) (interest in personal injury claim exempt up to $50,000 not including a claim for
exemplary or punitive damages); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-5(9) (Supp. 1981) (proceeds exempt "to the extent

that such proceeds are compensatory").
112. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 522(b)(l)(A) (1977).
113. S. REP. NO. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787,
5861.

114. The use ofstate law in defining the 1898 Act's property of the estate made it unnecessary for a court to
face this question very often. Only when the interest was not leviable and yet transferable by the debtor could it
be included within property of the estate, yet arguably be exempt. See Note, supra note 12, at 1478-80.
115. See, e.g., Page v. Edmonds, 187 U.S. 596, 601-06 (1902); Garber v. Bankers' Mortgage Co., 27 F.2d

609, 610-12 (D. Kan. 1928); In re T.C. Burnett & Co., 201 F. 162, 165 (E.D. Tenn. 1912).
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was whether the highest state court could conclude that the interest was
exempt under state law for bankruptcy purposes;" 6 at its narrowest, "exempt"
was simply equated with state exemption legislation. 17 If the Senate intended
its version to follow former section 6, an expansive reading of "exempt" was
not intended.
The radically different House provision allowed the debtor to select
either federal bankruptcy exemptions found in the Code or the exemptions
provided by "Federal, State, or local law, other than subsection (d) of this
section." 18 That bill contained no opt-out provision; the state-law option was
intended to permit states to set their own exemption levels within the parameters of the overriding fresh start policy of the Code." 9 The House probably
contemplated that state legislatures would establish these exemption levels.
More importantly, perhaps, Congress expressly addressed the exempt or
immune status of tenancies by the entirety and spendthrift trusts in the
Code. 20 If "exempt under... State or local law" were intended to include
property immune from creditors under a state's common law, both types of
interests would have become exempt under section 522(b)(2)(A), and further
Code provisions would have been unnecessary. Indeed, the very specificity of
the Code when dealing with the exempt or immune status of various interests
suggests that legislation
is the intended method for creating categories of
2
exempt property.1 1
Whether property interests not found in an opt-out state's exemption
statutes yet protected from creditors under state law are to be protected in
bankruptcy as well is thus decided by interpreting state legislation. While it
may well have been the congressional intent that no interest in property not
actually specified in an opt-out state's exemption provisions may be exempt
under section 522(b)(a)(A),' 22 it seems on balance more consistent with the
intent behind the Code's opt-out authorization 123 to look to state law itself to
determine whether an unlisted, de facto exemption is to operate in bankruptcy. Unfortunately, in most opt-out states the only pertinent legislation on that
question is the opt-out provision itself, and most of these provisions are too
abbreviated to support a definitive conclusion one way or the other.
116.
117.
118.
119.

E.g., Garber v. Bankers' Mortgage Co., 27 F.2d 609, 610-12 (D. Kan. 1928).
E.g., Page v. Edmonds, 187 U.S. 596, 601-06 (1902).
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1977).
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 126. Since the selection was the debtor's, and since there was no

opt-out provision at this point, providing the debtor with that option appears to be a compromise to attract those
states with state exemption provisions larger than those in the Code.
120. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b)(2)(B), 541(c)(2) (1980). See supra note 103.
121. See also Ray v. Dawson (In re Dawson), 10 Bankr. 680 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.), affd, 14 Bankr. 822

(E.D. Tenn. 1981), in which the court distinguished "exempt from process" in § 522(b)(2)(B) from "exempt
under. .. State or local law" in § 522(b)(2)(A): "Congress for some reason said 'exempt from process' rather
than 'immune from process.' 'Exempt' suggests statutory exemptions but Congress apparently meant common
law immunity. That should be obvious since state statutory exemptions are covered in the sub-paragraph (A) of
the same subsection." 10 Bankr. 680, 683 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981).
122. Cf. Page v. Edmonds, 187 U.S. 596, 601-06 (1902).

123. The intent, apparently, was to recognize the rights of states to control exemptions in bankruptcy as
they had before. See infra text accompanying notes 175-81.
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In a state that has simply denied its debtors use of the federal exemptions, the trustee will argue that the debtor's personal injury claim is not
exempt because the state legislature was fully aware of basic Code changes
(including the detailed federal exemptions dealing with personal injury claims)
and, given that knowledge, intended to replace the Code's list of exemptions
with its own statutory list. The debtor's counterargument will be that the
opt-out was intended to return the state to the old pre-Code system of exemptions. Since the former system protected the debtor's personal injury claim in
accordance with state nonbankruptcy law, the state legislature intended the
former exemption to be recognized in bankruptcy. While the latter argument
is probably more consistent with most opt-out states' legislative intent, 4 it
seems clear that unnecessary litigation will result from a legislature's failure
to speak to the question.
The foregoing problem is exacerbated in the replacement format, in
which an opt-out state not only deprives the debtor of the federal bankruptcy
exemptions, but affirmatively refers in a cryptic form to the exemptions the
debtor gets in bankruptcy. For example, when Indiana permits the debtor in
bankruptcy to exempt "only that property specified by Indiana law,"'25 what
does the legislature intend about common-law immunities available to nonbankrupt debtors? Are those immunities specified in state law? Virginia supplies perhaps a more glaring example. In opting out the Virginia legislature
expressed itself in the following language: "No individual may exempt from
the property of the estate in any bankruptcy proceeding the property specified
in subsection (d) of 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act (Public Law 95-598),
except as may otherwise be expressly permitted under this title. " 126Since

Virginia's exemption statutes said nothing about the personal injury cause of
action, which was immune from creditors under state law, the literal result is
that the personal injury claim becomes part of the bankruptcy estate and is not
exempt from liquidation and distribution to creditors. This obviously produced a serious disparity in the treatment of debtors in and out of bankruptcy.
Resolving the question inthe debtor's favor'27 required considerable judicial
2
ingenuity and an expenditure of resources that could have been avoided. u

124. Cf. In re Musgrove, 7 Bankr. 892 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981).
125. IND. CODE § 34-2-28-0.5 (Bums Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
126. VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
The language was apparently drafted by counsel for the Virginia Bankers Association. See Note, The
Failureoftthe VirginiaExemption Plan, 21 WM.& MARY L. REV. 851,878 n.141 (1980). Bankers were involved

in the passage of Nebraska's comparably narrow opt-out, retaining only the "personal exemptions provided
under Nebraska Statutes and the Nebraska Constitution," NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-15,-l05 (Supp. 1981).
Duncan, Through the Trap Door Darkly: NebraskaExemption Policy and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
60 NEB. L. REV. 219, 233 n.61 (1981).
127. In re Musgrove, 7 Bankr. 892 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981).

128. While the resources to pay for this litigation came initially from the estate available for distribution to
creditors, as we are often reminded, the costs of bankruptcy (and hence the costs of unfortunate legislative drafting) ultimately fall on consumers of credit. See FutureEarnings:Hearingson the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
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A central problem with most state opt-out legislation, then, is the uncertainty it has generated about the status of interests immune from creditors
under state common law and therefore not found within a state's exemption
statutes. The uncertainty invites unnecessary litigation, particularly in a state
that has opted out and limited the debtor to that property specified in state law
or in its statutes. The powerful notion that creditors should not be able to strip
a debtor of a claim to personal injuries, 29 particularly when the effects of
those injuries will continue after bankruptcy, 30 will continue to drive courts
to protect the debtor's de facto exemptions despite strong but nonspecific
statutory language such as Virginia's.
The solution is, of course, for opt-out state legislatures to come to grips
with the basic changes effected by the Bankruptcy Code and to recognize that
opting out not only deprives a debtor of the federal bankruptcy exemptions
but also injects into a very changed bankruptcy law the state's own policy.
That policy should be articulated by the state legislature in terms consistent
with its use in the new Code and not, as is more common, in terms of state law
that no longer has the use in bankruptcy that it once had.
The legislatures of those states that have opted out and, for whatever
reasons, wish to leave the debtor with the same exemptions in or out of
bankruptcy should make clear their intent that common-law immunities applicable outside bankruptcy will operate in bankruptcy as well. Amending the
opt-out provision by the simple incorporation by reference of state-law immunities would make legislative intent clear on this point and thereby eliminate uncertainty and unnecessary litigation within the system.13 ' The process
of incorporation by reference may result in questioning the underlying policy
of the state's common-law immunities, 32 a potentially complex but probably
overdue process. Nevertheless, that process, while complex, seems preferable to uncertainty and unnecessary litigation that will result from legislative
silence.
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., Ist
Sess. 19-20 (1981) (statement
of Robert W. Johnson, Krannert Graduate Sch. of Management, Purdue U.).
But perhaps borrowers will not ultimately bear all the unnecessary costs of the poorly drafted statute after
all. Implicit in the analysis of those who claim that increased costs are borne entirely by borrowers is the
assumption that the supply of credit is perfectly elastic. That assumption is very questionable. Weston, Some
Economic Fundamentalsfor an Analysis of Bankruptcy, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 47-51 (1977).
129. See supra notes 104-08.
130. See supra text accompanying note 108.
131. A revised opt-out provision might read as follows: "A debtor in this state in bankruptcy may exempt
from the bankruptcy estate all interests in property permanently exempt or immune from creditors in this state
outside bankruptcy." "Permanently" is necessary to make clear that it is not the legislative intent to permit the
debtor to exempt in bankruptcy interests in the equity of redemption or in growing crops, which are given
temporary exemptions in some states outside bankruptcy. See Garber v. Bankers' Mortgage Co., 27 F.2d 609
(D. Kan. 1928) (equity of redemption); In re T.C. Burnett & Co., 201 F. 162 (E.D. Tenn. 1912) (growing crops).
132. The common-law immunity of the debtor's entire personal injury claim in bankruptcy may, for example, be questioned on two fronts, at least: the propriety of allowing the debtor to exempt reimbursement for
unpaid prefiling medical expenses, which bankruptcy will discharge, and the policy of differentiating, for
exemption purposes, a personal injury claim from its resulting judgment. The Code exemption provisions
address both problems. See II U.S.C. § 522(d)(II )(D)-(E) (1980). Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IC-160(a)(8) (Supp.
1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-23-5(9) (Supp. 1981).
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B. The Propriety of Using the Same Exemptions in the Two Systems
As indicated earlier, the apparent intent of much opt-out legislation is to
create a parity in the exemptions a debtor enjoys in and out of bankruptcy. As
already discussed, the ostensible failure of many states to recognize basic
changes effected by the Code has produced gaps in the expression of legislative intent on the status of the debtor's personal injury claim and perhaps on
other interests that are immune but not statutorily exempt under state law.
Those particular gaps can be eliminated if desired. The focus here is shifted to
a substantive theme running through much of the opt-out legislation: that of
attempting to create a parity in the exemption rights of debtors in and out of
bankruptcy.
If there is such an effort to create parity, it will not succeed in most places
because different law will change the substance of the state exemption rights
when they are asserted in bankruptcy. 3 3 Moreover, as will be discussed,
more basic differences in the operation of the two debtor-creditor systems
suggest that the same exemptions will almost always have a different impact
on the debtor depending on whether the debtor is in or out of bankruptcy.
Finally, attempting to leave the debtor with the same exempt assets in
both systems may itself be questionable policy. It may be that the two systems have become sufficiently different that the notion that exemptions satisfactory for one system can serve adequately the other ought to be carefully
examined. 34 If the parity-of-exemptions idea rests on questionable assumptions, they should be exposed in order to increase an opt-out state's flexibility
to develop and experiment with novel exemptions specifically designed for
use in bankruptcy. The place to begin is with an examination of the reasons
that might support a policy of having the same exemption provisions both in
and out of bankruptcy.
1. Symmetry.
Support for the notion that exemptions should be the same inside bankruptcy as outside might come from beliefs that could be grouped under the
heading of "symmetry." Exemptions strike a balance between creditor rights
and debtor protection, and it seems plausible that the balance at a particular
time should be independent of the procedure-bankruptcy or levy and execution-through which the creditor obtains satisfaction of debts due. In terms of
debtor protection, the idea might be that procedure should be irrelevant to the
protection afforded debtors through exemption statutes and common-law
immunities. Shifting the focus to the creditor, a related notion might be that
creditors assess risk and lend money, in part, by evaluating the amount and
availability of a debtor's nonexempt property. 35 The exempt or nonexempt
133. See infra text accompanying notes 135-60.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 31-65.
135. Cf. Vukowich, Debtors' Exemptions Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 856-59 (1974); Note, Bankruptcy
Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 1800?, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 667 (1968).
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status of the debtor's property on which those decisions are made arguably
should not vary with the procedures ultimately utilized to obtain it in satisfaction of debt. This symmetry notion might be superficially compelling in its
apparent order and simplicity. It offers little support, however, for a state's
using the same exemptions in and out of bankruptcy.
The symmetry notion fails because of its underlying premises. The proposition is that with the same exemption provisions operating in both systems,
it will be immaterial to the debtor or creditor whether bankruptcy or state levy
and execution is utilized to distribute the debtor's property: in both cases the
debtor will come out with the same exempt property, and creditors will come
out with the same nonexempt property. Implicit in the symmetry idea, therefore, is the proposition that the same statutory exemption provisions will
produce the same ultimate impact on debtor and creditor property interests in
both systems. As will be seen, the notion breaks down at this point because a
variety of factors that directly affect the ultimate impact of a given exemption
provision are different in the two systems. These factors make it unlikely that
the same exemption provision will have the same impact in both systems or,
put differently, that for given statutorily exempt property the debtor and
creditor will be treated in the same way in both systems.
The symmetry notion fails to support a policy of identical exemptions in
the two systems primarily because federal law will be used in bankruptcy to
decide exemption-related questions that are decided by state law outside
bankruptcy, and federal law can produce results in bankruptcy different from
those produced by the same exemption provisions outside bankruptcy. The
real impact on a debtor and on a creditor of a given exemption provision
depends not only on the provision itself but on the procedure for claiming it,
the validity of a waiver of the exemption right, and other related rules through
which the exemption provision produces tangible exempt property for the
debtor and takes it away from the creditor. For the symmetry argument to
support a policy of identical exemptions, the other rules that have an impact
on the proceeds of the exemption provisions must be identical as well, so that
the impact on the debtor and creditor in the two systems will be the same.
Almost invariably, different legal rules that have an effect on the impact of
exemption provisions operate in the two systems.
The symmetry notion was considerably more plausible under the 1898
Act, under which it probably developed, 11 6 because in contrast with the new
Code's approach, most questions concerning the exempt status of a debtor's
property were decided by state law. Exempt property was then outside the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court,1 37 and as a result, the validity of the

exemption as against all types of creditors was determined by state law in the
136. The symmetry idea could only develop with a bankruptcy statute making state and bankruptcy
exemptions the same in all cases. The 1898 Act was the first such bankruptcy statute in the United States. See

supra text accompanying notes 21-33.
137. Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
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state court. 38 Creditors claiming special rights in the exempt property existed
then as now and included those given special status under state law such as
tort claimants or alimony claimants,'39 those in whose favor the debtor had
executed a waiver of exemptions,' 40 or those holding a valid lien on the
exempt property. 41 The 1898 Act's system of using state law to decide the
rights of these creditors to otherwise exempt assets of the bankrupt debtor
and of using state law to exclude nontransferable, nonleviable property from
the bankruptcy estate 142 suggested a roughly comparable treatment of the
debtor's exempt or immune property in bankruptcy or out.' 43
The current Code takes an approach different from that of the 1898 Act
by supplying federal law to decide exemption-related questions formerly decided under state law. Federal bankruptcy law and analogous opt-out state
law are apt to differ in their approach to exempt-property questions in at least
two respects: first, the extent to which the law protects statutorily exempt
property in which a security interest has been created for the creditor; and
second, the availability of statutorily exempt property to satisfy the debts of
classes of creditors given special rights under state law.
A security interest in exempt property is not nearly as secure in bankruptcy as it is under most state law. Congress extended to debtors in bankruptcy the right to avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests in certain classes of property if that property is exempt under section
522(b) of the Code. 4 This provision makes good sense because such a security interest, easily created under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial

138. See generally Note, supra note 12,at 1475-78.
139. See Countryman, supra note 43, 708-09. An analogous exception is that extended, even without a
security interest, to holders of a purchase-money claim to the exempt property. For example, Colorado's
legislation provides: "No exemption for purchaseprice. None of the property described in section 13-54-102

shall be exempt from levy and sale on writ of attachment or writ of execution for the purchase price of such
property." COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-103 (Supp. 1981). See also OR. REV. STAT. § 23.220 (1981).
140. See Countryman, supra note 43, at 709; Note, supra note 12, at 1494-97.
141. See Note, supra note 12, at 1475-76.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 81-100.
143. The comparable legal treatment generally accorded exempt assets had some exceptions. For example,

nonleviable but transferable assets were brought into the estate and distributed to creditors in bankruptcy when
they would not have been outside. See Note, supra note 12, at 1478-79. In addition, the debtor could destroy a

waiver-holder's interest in the debtor's exempt property simply by waiving the exemption in bankruptcy. The
effect would be a bankruptcy distribution of that property to all creditors. Id. at 1494-95.
144. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(2) (1980). It provides:

(f)
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest
of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would
have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is-(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals,

crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family, or
household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a

dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
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Code, 45 may be simply a modem form of the executory waiver of exemptions' 46 condemned by most states as violative of public policy.' 47
In an opt-out state the effect of the Bankruptcy Code provision is that
such a lien on specified classes of state-created exempt property will be
avoidable in bankruptcy. Outside bankruptcy, on the other hand, the security
interest likely will be enforceable since most states, somewhat incomprehensively,'8 have not recognized this waiver in Article 9 guise. 49 Since such
security interests are created as a matter of routine in many consumer loan
transactions,' 5 in many cases an opt-out state debtor will be entitled to different amounts of exempt property under the same
exemption provisions de15
1
not.
or
bankruptcy
in
is
he
whether
on
pending
Just as some creditors are given special rights when state law recognizes
their lien on exempt property, other creditors are given special rights to
exempt property by the exemption statutes themselves. Most states have
created special classes of creditors against whom the debtor's exemption
rights will not run.' Common classes of excepted creditors include alimony
and family-support claimants, tort claimants, wage claimants, those with
claims arising from the supply of necessities to the debtor, and tax claim145. See U.C.C. § 9-203 (1972).
146. Cf. S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS, REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 309-10 (3d ed. 1979).
147. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MANAGEMENT, CREDIT MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAWS

576 (1981); Note, supra note 12, at 1496; Annot., 94 A.L.R. 2D 967, 974, 981 (1964). See Mayhugh v. Coon, 460
Pa. 128, 331 A.2d 452 (1975), and authorities there cited.
148. One suspects that because such a security interest is not called a waiver, because property rights are
more clearly implicated by the different form of words the debtor signs, and because Article 9 of the U.C.C. will
be involved, the public policy arguments, however strong, supporting the nonwaivability of exemption rights are
less easily embraced when the waiver is in Article 9 form.
149. A handful of states have extended the no-waiver-of-exemptions principle to the nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money security interest situation in varying degrees. See Haines, Security Interests in Exempt
Personalty:Toward Safeguarding Basic Exempt Necessities, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 215, 234 (1981). Maine,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 4401 (1980), New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §399-A:7 (Supp. 1981),
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1C-1601(e)(7) (Supp. 1981), and Virginia, VA. CODE § 34-28 (1976), are
opt-out states in this group.
150. See House Hearings,supra note 21, at 761-62 (statement of David H. Williams); id. at 939-41 (statement of Earnest L. Samson, Jr.).
151. Analogous, but far less controversial, is Congress' inclusion ofa provision making ineffective waivers
of rights to exemptions, 11 U.S.C. § 522(e) (1980). This provision is likely to cause disparate treatment of
debtors in and out of bankruptcy only in Alabama, the only opt-out state that continues to recognize some such
waivers. Broadway v. Household Fin. Corp., 351 So. 2d 1373 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 1378
(Ala. 1977). Even in Alabama, however, the effectiveness of waivers is somewhat restricted by statute. ALA.
CODE § 6-10-126 (1977). See generally, Haines, Security Interestsin Exempt Personalty:Toward Safeguarding
Basic Exempt Necessities, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 215, 234 (1981).
A direct legislative attempt to avoid the impact of the Code provision in bankruptcy (e.g., perhaps, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.661(c) (Page 1980)) will probably fail under the supremacy clause. Unless they are
eliminated entirely, cutting back on state household goods or tools of the trade exemptions to which § 522(0(2) is
limited will only decrease the differential impact, not eliminate it. Perhaps the only way a state might neutralize
this difference is to recognize that voiding such security interests is simply a logical extension of a policy voiding
executory waivers of exemption rights, (S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 309-10 (3d ed. 1979)), particularly since the enactment of U.C.C. Article 9, and to enact legislation
comparable to § 522(0(2) at the state level.
152. See generallyJoslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization,34 IND. L.J. 355, 372 (1959);
Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 852-63 (1974). See also supra note 139
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ants.5I 3 The special status of such creditors was recognized in proceedings
under the 1898 Act by permitting the excepted creditor to utilize state procedure outside bankruptcy to obtain the exempt assets over which the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction.' 54 The implications of Lockvood v. Exchange Bank,155 in turn, postponed the debtor's discharge so that the excepted creditor could proceed against
the exempt property in state court with a
156
viable, undischarged claim.
Code section 522(c) now provides that "property exempted under this
section" will not be liable during or after the case for any debts other than
alimony and support debts, tax liabilities, and certain liens.' 57 Since it is
through section 522 that either state or federal bankruptcy exemptions are
implemented, this Code provision appears to define excepted creditors for
bankruptcy purposes independently of a state's policy on the same question. 158 Thus, even when an opt-out state's exemptions operate in bankruptcy,
that portion of the state exemption policy dealing with excepted creditors will
probably 59 be superseded by the Code provision. To the extent that a state
has defined classes of excepted creditors differently, the same exemption
provisions will operate differently in bankruptcy than outside.
Symmetry in the legal principles used inside and outside bankruptcy to
determine what a debtor ultimately can reserve from creditors, in short, does
not now generally exist in most jurisdictions that have opted out and have
injected the state exemptions in effect outside bankruptcy into the Code. This
divergence represents a substantial change from pre-Code law, which recognized in its operation a state's policy toward creditors holding special rights to
exempt property. The present difference in the substantive legal principles
153. See Countryman, supra note 43, at 708-09; Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355, 372-75 (1959); Note, supra note 12, at 1469-70.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 136-43.
155. 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
156. See generally Countryman, supra note 43, at 709-11; Kennedy, supra note 17, at 462; Note, supra note
12, at 1475-78. The broad criticism levelled by these and other authors at the Lockwood doctrine undoubtedly

influenced the decision to overrule the case by including the debtor's exempt property in the estate under Code
§ 541(a)(I).
157. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) provides:

(c) Unless the case is dismissed, property exempted under this section is not liable during or after
the case for any debt of the debtor that arose, or that is determined under section 502 of this title as if
such claim had arisen before the commencment of the case, except(1) a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a)(1) or section 523(a)(5) of this title; or
(2) a lien that is(A) not avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title;
(B) not voided under section 506(d) of this title; or
(C) (i) a tax lien, notice of which is properly filed; and (ii) avoided under section 545(2) of

this title.
158. On the complex interaction of state and federal bankruptcy law on the excepted creditor question, see
Stem, State Exemption Law in Bankruptcy: The Excepted Creditor as a Medium for Appraising Aspects of
Bankruptcy Reform, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 70, 73-82 (1980).

159. It is possible to argue that the entire state exemption policy enters the Code through § 522(b)(2)(A),
and that therefore, when state exemptions are operable, the state excepted creditor policy is as well. The
specificity of § 522(c) and Congress' awareness of the Lockwood v. Exchange Bank doctrine under the 1898 Act
suggests the contrary. See also Stem, State Exemption Law in Bankruptcy: The Excepted Creditor as a
Medium for Appraising Aspects of Bankruptcy Reform, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 70, 73-82 (1980).
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operable in the two systems results frequently in differences in the6impact of
0
the same provision on debtors and creditors in the two systems.'
Just as a state could reduce by suitable legislation the problems prompted
by the Code's questionable recognition of state common-law immunities in
bankruptcy,' 6' a state could reduce the foregoing differences in impact by
making its own law on these exemption-related questions track the Code's.
Unfortunately, other aspects of the two systems make it likely that exemptions designed to have a specified impact on the debtor-creditor balance in
one system will have a different impact on that balance in the other. A couple
of observations should suffice to illustrate that there is-and probably can
be-no symmetry in fact in the impact of the same exemptions in the two
systems.
Consider, for example, the vastly different contexts the two systems
offer for the overextended debtor to assert rights to exempt property. Outside
bankruptcy, the claim of a personal property exemption will be prompted by a
levy on specific property and asserted within the context of a levy and execution proceeding. State procedures for the debtor to make the exemption claim
will vary widely. It is sufficient for present purposes to observe that the
debtor in this creditor-intitiated situation likely will be caught by surprise and
likely will not be represented by counsel. Moreover, a number of states will
permit him to waive his exemptions at some stage during the levy and execution proceedings. 6 2
In contrast, consider the debtor in bankruptcy with the same statutory
exemption rights. It is likely that the debtor, not the creditor, precipitated the
bankruptcy proceeding in which the claim of exempt property will be made. 16s
The debtor in bankruptcy will be more likely than his counterpart faced with
levy and execution to be represented by counsel. And even without counsel,
it seems unlikely that in a proceeding that concludes with the debtor being
separated from all nonexempt property and sent off with a fresh start, the
debtor's exemption rights will be lost through ignorance, inadvertence, or
some form of waiver. 164
160. The symmetry discussion in the text is focussed on the debtor's bankruptcy estate as of a particular
date and on the way in which the two systems with given exemption provisions differ in the division of that
property between the debtor and creditors. From a broader perspective, the discharge in bankruptcy has always
made the two systems asymmetrical. Once the hypothetical estate is divided outside bankruptcy, the partially

satisfied creditor class is left with claims against the debtor for unsatisfied debt; in bankruptcy most of those
claims are discharged. Obviously, to the extent that those claims have value, the creditor class gets less in
bankruptcy than outside.
In addition, the trustee's avoiding powers, while not affecting the share of the creditor class vis-4-vis the
debtor, can drastically change a particular creditor's returns in bankruptcy from what they would have been
outside bankruptcy. See generally 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 547.01-.02 (L. King ed. 15th ed. 1981).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.

162. For a summary of states that do and do not permit these waivers, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CREDIT MANAGEMENT, CREDIT MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAWS 576-78 (1981).

163. For the 12 month period ending June 30, 1981, there were 360,329 bankruptcy cases commenced, 358,
997 of which were voluntary filings. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS A-122 (1981).

164. Paradoxically, outside bankruptcy it may be that the risk that a debtor will lose rights by ignorance or
inadvertence is greater than in bankruptcy because the class of debtors most needing the shelter of state
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The notion that exemption provisions should be the same in both systems
because debtors and creditors should be treated the same in both systems thus
fails on two levels. First, federal and state legal rules directly affecting the
shares of the debtor's assets the competing sides receive are likely to produce
differing results from the same exemption provision in the two situations.
Second, even if one made all the exemption-related rules operate the same way
in both systems, the different contexts suggest that the debtors would be likely
in most places to receive a different measure of exemption protection in
bankruptcy than outside.
Simply put, the reason that the symmetry notion fails to support the same
exemptions in both systems is that the systems themselves are not now symmetrical in the rules they apply to an exemption provision to produce its
ultimate take home value, nor are they similar in the trappings of procedure,
judicial attitude, or emphasis, which also have an unquantifiable but probably
real effect on the ultimate benefit received by the debtor in the two systems.
The differences in the legal rules applied to given exemption provisions have
come with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act and its change from
state to federal law in several areas dealing with exemptions. The asymmetry
in the thrust of the systems themselves has developed incrementally as bankruptcy has changed to its present focus on debtor relief. The asymmetry of the
two systems means that the same exemptions will not automatically produce
equal treatment for debtor and creditor in both systems. One must search
further for a rationale for a state's use through an opt-out of the same exemption provisions in both systems.
2. Incentive
A second rationale for making exemptions in and out of bankruptcy the
same-indeed, a reason asserted for opting out 65 -is that differences in the
exemptions available in the two systems will drive up the bankruptcy rate.
This close relative of the symmetry argument is bottomed on the probably
exemptions might be those least likely to be aware of them or those most easily persuaded to waive them. What
are the characteristics of the typical debtor in need of exemption protection, but for whom bankruptcy is not a
viable option? We know that debtors in bankruptcy typically are high school educated and have incomes. See D.
STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 42-44 (1971); cf. Schuchman &
Rhorer, PersonalBankruptcy Datafor Opt-Out Hearings and Other Purposes, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 9-14

(1982). Might those in real need of exemption protection outside bankruptcy be in a lower socioeconomic class?
If so, exemption legislation designed to protect them is incomplete without suitable provisions for advising those
persons of their rights and rigorously scrutinizing any supposed waiver of those rights. Some states take just this
approach. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ IC-1601(c), IC-1603(4) (Supp. 1981). Cf. Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d
50 (3d Cir. 1980).

165. A recent expression of the argument was presented in connection with a plea to the South Carolina
Legislature to opt out:
[U]nless the General Assembly enacts a specific statute depriving debtors of the right to claim the
federal exemptions enumerated in section 522(d), a substantial and perhaps irresistible incentive to file
consumer bankruptcies will arise with the probable result of a significant increase in the rate of
consumer bankruptcies in South Carolina.
Lacy, South Carolina's Statutory Exemptions and Consumer Bankruptcy, 30 S.C.L. REV. 643, 687 (1979).

South Carolina ultimately opted out. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-425 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981).
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irrebuttable economic idea that larger bankruptcy exemptions will give some
debtors an incentive to file for bankruptcy.
The idea that different exemptions in and out of bankruptcy would induce
more bankruptcies appears first to have surfaced in one of the seminal exemption-reform articles. 66 The idea was that uniform exemptions in bankruptcy
would induce debtors in states with smaller nonbankruptcy exemptions to
elect bankruptcy in order to retain more property and would induce creditors
in states with larger nonbankruptcy exemptions to precipitate bankruptcy to
get more property. While the same author apparently changed his views after
he became head of the Bankruptcy Commission, 67 the idea picked up adherents. The argument that the exemption provisions of the Reform Act might
have an impact on bankruptcy rates and that opting out and making exemptions the same in both systems can eliminate that impact requires examination.
In most states the insertion of state exemptions into the Bankruptcy
Reform Act through an opt-out does not necessarily eliminate an exemptionrelated incentive for someone to file a bankruptcy petition. As indicated
above, even when the statutory exemptions are identical for both systems,
there seldom will be an identical impact on the debtor because of the different
applicable rules and contexts of the two systems. For example, if a debtor has
created a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in statutorily
exempt furniture,"'s it is likely that, even with identical exemptions, bankruptcy will be more attractive because the debtor is threatened 69 with the loss
of his furniture outside bankruptcy whereas in bankruptcy he may retain
it.' 70 At least for the reasonably well-advised debtor, it is therefore not justifiable to conclude that making the exemptions the same in both systems automatically will eliminate whatever exemption incentive there might be toward
bankruptcy.
But even though debtors may simply look at the statutory exemptions
available in the two systems and conclude that federal bankruptcy exemptions
offer more retained property and therefore an incentive toward bankruptcy, it
requires a second step to conclude that the incentive supplied will control the
166. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 452.
167. See House Hearings, supra note 21, at 170, quoted infra note 173.
168. As indicated above, see supra text accompanying note 150, those security interests are created
routinely in consumer loan transactions. A Federal Trade Commission study conducted from 1972 to 1974
suggested that the consumer credit industry employed "the more severe forms of contractual remedies, such as
wage assignments, seizure of property, etc., to collect approximately 240 million dollars from some 350,000
delinquent consumers each year." House Hearings, supra note 21, at 759 (statement of David H. Williams).
169. It is apparently the threat of seizure of household goods that is most valuable to creditors since the
goods themselves depreciate rapidly and are seldom worth much to the creditor. It turns out in practice that
such goods are seldom seized despite the creditor's right to repossess them. House Hearings,supra note 21, at
761-62 (statement of David H. Williams). Cf. Leff, Injury, Ignorance, and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive
Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 5-18 (1970).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 144-51. In an analogous context, if it appears that a debtor's large
personal injury claim might be reachable in bankruptcy but not outside, a possibility in many opt-out states, see
supra text accompanying notes 102-30, creditors will have an incentive to file an involuntary bankruptcy
petition to obtain distribution of that property.
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bankruptcy decision in more than a handful of cases. This is because the
incentive argument actually has two components: first, that higher exemptions
in bankruptcy offer some debtors an incentive toward bankruptcy, and second,
that the incentive supplied by that difference in exemptions influences the rate
of bankruptcy filings. The first component is difficult to rebut because it
expresses thepreference of more property to less. In view of the other factors
probably influencing a decision to fie a bankruptcy petition, however, it
seems unlikely that the second proposition is valid.
Considered in a vacuum, an overwhelmed debtor who could keep more in
bankruptcy than outside would inevitably choose bankruptcy. But the debtor
operates not in a vacuum but in a complicated world where a decision to
choose bankruptcy carries complex legal, moral, and personal consequences.
Because entitlement to exempt property is only one of many factors to be
considered in the often momentous decision to choose bankruptcy as a solution to debt, the relationship between disparity in a debtor's exempt property
in and out of bankruptcy and the bankruptcy rates is likely to be weaker than
might be expected at first glance. The availability of discharge from debt, the
avoidance of certain security interests, the stay of creditor enforcement actions, the stigma still attached to and sense of personal shame associated with
bankruptcy, the required surrender of all interests in property, and the different procedure and legal fees associated with bankruptcy are among the many
factors a consumer debtor might consider in making a decision whether to
proceed with bankruptcy. In this complex of factors, which includes stay of
creditor enforcement and discharge from most debts on one side and the
personal admission of financial failure implied by personal bankruptcy on the
other, the statutorily defined amount of exempt property in or out of bankruptcy is likely to assume, in most cases, a subordinate role in the debtor's
decision about bankruptcy. 7' Indeed, preliminary and inconclusive empirical
studies have begun to suggest that more generous federal exemptions
in bank72
ruptcy do not have a demonstrable impact on bankruptcy rates.1
Moreover, larger bankruptcy exemptions can only act as an incentive to
bankruptcy when a debtor is aware of the disparity between bankruptcy and
nonbankruptcy exemptions. A debtor who has reached the point of measuring
state debtors' exemptions out of bankruptcy against different exemptions
available in bankruptcy likely will have sought professional help, will have
faced the personal crisis one contemplating personal bankruptcy must face,
and perhaps will be somewhat predisposed towards a bankruptcy solution.
Given the magnitude of the other factors and the likely level of sophistication
of the debtor in a position to measure all the factors, it is unreasonable to

171. Analogously, the creditor decision to put a debtor into bankruptcy involuntarily is similarly complex.

That creditors might have some incentive to do so, see supra note 170, does not without more tell us that they
will.
172. Schuchman & Rhorer, PersonalBankruptcy Datafor Opt-OutHearingsand Other Purposes,56 Abl.
BANKR. L.J. 1, 1-3 (1982).
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assume that a disparity in the exemptions afforded by state law outside bankruptcy on the one hand and federal or state law in bankruptcy on the other will
have a decisive impact on the debtor's decision in more than a handful of
cases. 713 Until data are assembled, and because potential reasons for disparate
treatment exist, it makes absolutely no sense to bottom policy on the incentive hypothesis, the validity of which is to be seriously doubted.' 74
3. Legal Constraint

A final argument that might be raised to support an opt-out state's use of
the same exemptions in and out of bankruptcy is that the states are without
authority to do anything other than opt out, that is, that Congress did not
authorize a state to develop bankruptcy-only exemption provisions. Because
the legislative history of the last-minute opt-out compromise is so scant, it is
difficult to assess definitively congressional intent on this question. Available
evidence suggests, however, that the Code includes at least limited authority
to develop exemptions specifically for state debtors in bankruptcy.
Code section 522(b)(2)(A) recognizes as exempt in an opt-out state "any
property that is exempt under ... State or local law applicable on the date of
filing of the petition. . .

."'75

The legislation itself contains no limit on an

opt-out state's ability to develop exemption legislation for bankruptcy purposes only.

173. In the words of Professor Kennedy, testifying for the Bankruptcy Commission:
The Commission was aware of and concerned by the possibility that a discrepancy between state and
federal exemptions may provide an artificial incentive for filing petitions in bankruptcy. If the federal
exemptions are more generous than the state exemption, a debtor may seek relief in bankruptcy in
order to get the advantage of the larger allowance against creditors. If the federal exemptions are less
liberal than the state law, creditors may wish to place their debtor in bankruptcy to reach the property
that is exempt under state law. The Commission was at first troubled and deterred by this consideration from proposing federal exemptions but ultimately concluded that it was an insufficient basis for
recommending either pre-emption of the field by federal law or retention of the present incorporation of
state exemption laws by reference into the Bankruptcy Act. The fact that bankruptcy is an available
recourse for the debtor or the creditors will be a limitation on the extent to which the parties will rely on
their rights as determined by state law. They will negotiate and settle in the light of what advantages
and disadvantages are available under both systems. The fact that bankruptcy requires a surrender of
all nonexempt property and still carries a stigma will be deterrents to a person contemplating voluntary
bankruptcy to get the advantage of a more generous exemption. The realization that the debtor will
probably get a discharge and that all creditors will share in the distribution of proceeds of the sale of
nonexempt assets will be substantial deterrents to creditors contemplating involuntary bankruptcy as a
way of reaching assets of their debtor that are beyond their reach under state law.
House Hearings, supra note 21, at 170.

174. An implicit assumption in the text is the widely held notion that it is desirable to keep the bankruptcy
rates as low as possible. That assumption is not self-evident and has been made here for purposes of analysis
only. It is unclear just what lies behind this widely held belief. For example, it would seem that if the bankruptcy
fresh start does, in fact, revitalize debtors and make them more productive than they were before, an increase in
the bankruptcy rate would result in a national economic and psychological boost. Cf. House Hearings, supra
note 21, at 388.
Creative thought about the bankruptcy process ought to include the examination of such basic, widely held,
and seemingly unassailable assumptions. Cf. Schuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of Bankruptcy," 21

U.C.L.A. L. REV. 403, 438-39 (1973). See also infra notes 246-47.
175. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1980).
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Moreover, it appears that the opt-out compromise was perceived as a
states' rights victory. 76 Rather than allowing the source of bankruptcy exemptions to be changed to the federal government for the first time in recent
history, the opt-out provision preserved for states the option of maintaining a
measure of authority over that component of the bankruptcy process, as they
had under the old Act. It seems more consistent with a states' rights purpose
and with notions of federalism that Congress permitted states maximum flexibility to specify "State or local law" for purposes of bankruptcy'" independently of the exemption provisions otherwise applicable within their states.'7
In any event, at least seven states have enacted bankruptcy-only exemptions
under the new law,'179 and no one has thus far mounted a successful challenge
based on congressional intent to states' authority to do so under the Code.'o
It seems unlikely that such a challenge will succeed.'8 '
176. Senator Wallop, commenting on the opt-out provision in the compromise Bill, maintained that "we
have won an important victory for the rights of States to determine exemptions for the debtors of the States,"
124 CONG. REC. 33,992 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Wallop on the compromise Bill).
177. Indeed, part of the Senate's justification for retaining the 1898 Act's system of looking entirely to state
law for exemption provisions was that "current law has allowed the several State legislatures flexibility to meet
the needs and fresh start requirements of the debtors of their particular States." S.REP., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5792. See also supra note 64; infra note 243.
178. To this effect, see In re Vasko, 6 Bankr. 317, 320 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); cf.Curry v. Associates
Fin. Serv., 11Bankr. 716, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981).
179. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 36-211 (Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1301.1 (Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE
§ 627.6 (Supp. 1982); KY. REV. STAT. § 427.160 (Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-03.1 (Supp. 1981);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66 (Page Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 38-10-4 (Supp. 1982).
180. In Kanter v. Moneymaker (In re Kanter), 505 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1974), in question was the consititutionality of a California statute that made the debtor's personal injury claim unreachable in bankruptcy when it
was reachable by creditors outside bankruptcy. The court held that the statute was invalid under the supremacy
clause because it thwarted the congressional intent of the 1898 Act to give creditors in bankruptcy what they
were entitled to outside bankruptcy. While the opinion contains language suggesting that creditors must get
the same assets in both systems under the Act, id. at 231, the case is readily distinguishable from the situation
under the current Code. The court noted, for example, that in the Act's §70a(5) Congress had specifically vested
the Trustee with the debtor's personal injury claim to the extent that creditors could reach the claim under state
law. Id. The evidence showed there was a congressional intent that parity exist at least in personal injury
claims. By contrast, when enacting the current Code, Congress rejected the parity idea by incorporating into the
Code federal exemptions that may produce property far in excess of that available to debtors outside bankruptcy
in a state that has not opted out. It has also rejected the idea by the use of federal exemption-related rules, which
made creditors' shares of the pie different from what they might be outside bankruptcy. See supra text accompanying notes 142-59. In short, the case is readily distinguishable because the Code reflects the congressional
intent that a fresh start for the debtor is more important than a policy ofgiving creditors the same assets in both
systems. Cf. In re Vasko, 6 Bankr. 317, 322 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
181. An argument that a state is precluded from enacting special exemptions only for bankruptcy purposes
could be pieced together from several items of legislative history. The Senate Bill had no federal exemptions
whatsoever and simply made exempt those interests in property "exempt under Federal, State, or local law."
S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 522(b)(1)(A) (1977). The accompanying Senate report said that the provision
"tracks current law." S. REP. NO. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5861. "Current law" could include the congressional intent, as interpreted in Kanter, of keeping
creditors' shares the same in both systems. Finally, commenting on the opt-out provision of the compromise
Bill, Senator DeConcini stated: "In the area of exemptions, it was agreed that a Federal standard will be codified
but that the states could at any time reject them [sic] in which case the State exemption laws would continue to
prevail." 124 CONG. REC. 33,990 (1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini on the compromise Bill).
As suggested in the text, it seems on balance more consistent with the Code as enacted that parity of
creditors' rights in both systems has given way to the fresh start as the dominant federal policy in the exemption
area. It seems more consistent with that intent that a state be permitted under the supremacy clause to enact
bankruptcy-only exemptions to further the fresh start policy even if the result will be a somewhat different
distribution in bankruptcy than outside. While there are probably limits, grounded in the bankruptcy policy of
equitable distribution of assets, to a state's expansion of exemptions in bankruptcy, it seems highly unlikely that
those limits, whatever they might be, will be approached by any state in the near future.
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The Code has been challenged as being unconstitutional insofar as it
permits a state to enact exemptions for use only in bankruptcy.' 2 The source
of the challenges is the constitutional grant of congressional power to establish "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United
States"'' 83 and Hanover National Bank v. Moyses,184 in which the Supreme
Court interpreted the clause in connection with the 1898 Act's exemption
provision. The foundation of the argument is the Hanover statement that
the system is, in the constitutional sense, uniform throughout the United States
when the trustee takes in each state whatever would have been available to the
creditors if the bankrupt law had not been passed. The general operation of the law

is uniform although it may result in certain particulars differently in different
states. 185
While several courts' 86 and commentators' 8 7 have discussed the constitutionality of the opt-out provision in general terms and have concluded that the
provision is constitutional, the rationale is generally that if the 1898 Act's
exemption provision was constitutional, so must be the current Code's. Perhaps because of the relatively recent development of the fresh start concept
and its association with exemptions in bankruptcy, a state's creation of special exemptions for use in bankruptcy never came up under the old Act.
However, the question has come up under the Code in Ohio, an opt-out
state that has created specific exemptions to operate only in bankruptcy. 188
Ohio's scheme has survived constitutional challenges under the uniformity
clause in several cases;' 89 the dominant rationale appears to be based on the
second sentence of the Hanover statement quoted above. Uniformity in this
context seems to require only that the same bankruptcy law apply to all the
states without discrimination-so long as all states can do the same thing, the
law is uniform in the constitutional sense. As one Ohio court' 9° put it: "The
uniformity which is required by the Constitution relates to the law itself and
not to its results upon the varying rights of debtor and creditor under the laws
of the several states."' 191
182. See, e.g., Stover v. Thorp Credit Inc. (In re Stover), 13 Bankr. I (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); In re
Vasko, 6 Bankr. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
183. U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
184. 186 U.S. 181 (1902).

185. Id. at 190.
186. See, e.g., In re Sullivan, No. 81-1921 (7th Cir. May 10, 1982); In re Lausch, 12 Bankr. 55, 55-56

(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
187. See, e.g., Hertz, Bankruptcy Code Exemptions: Notes on the Effect of State Law, 54 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 339, 342-54 (1980); Comment, Exemptions and Lien Avoidance Underthe Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
and Ohio Law, 14 AKRON L. REV. 632-47 (1981).
188. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A)(4)(A), (A)(17) (Page Supp. 1980). The provisions permit the

debtor in bankruptcy in appropriate circumstances to exempt an additional $400 in cash and "any property" respectively. On the Ohio exemption provisions, see generally Fisher, The FederalExemption Scheme: Delayed
Until 1983 For Ohio Bankrupts, 49 CIN. L. REV. 791 (1980); Note, Ohio Opts Out of the FederalBankruptcy
Eremptions and Revises its Exemption Laws, 5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 461 (1980).
189. E.g., Stover v. Thorp Credit Inc. (In re Stover), 13 Bankr. 1, 3-5 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); In re
Vasko, 6 Bankr. 317,320 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); see also Central Bank v. Ambrose (In re Ambrose), 4 Bankr.

395 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Hill, 4 Bankr. 310 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
190. Stover v. Thorp Credit Inc. (In re Stover), 13 Bankr. I (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
191. Id. at 4 (citing Thomas v. Woods, 173 F. 585 (8th Cir. 1909)). Cf. Hertz, Bankruptcy Code Exemptions: Notes on the Effect of State Law, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 339, 342 (1980).
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While the meaning of, and limits (if any) imposed by, the uniformity
clause remain uncertain and perplexing in this context,' 92 it appears unlikely
that a uniformity clause challenge to an opt-out state's exemption legislation
designed specifically for bankruptcy purposes will be sustained.

IV. A POLICY APPROACH TO BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS
Arguments supporting an opt-out state's use of the same exemptions in
and out of bankruptcy have been addressed because sound reasons support an
opt-out state legislature's ability and attempt to develop exemption provisions
specifically for bankruptcy purposes. One justification for permitting states to
opt out is state diversity: differing state conditions support varying exemption
levels in the bankruptcy context t93 The idea, in part, is to permit states to
adjust a component of the bankruptcy remedy to local conditions. It seems
plausible, for example, that debtors in rural areas have different exemption
needs from those in urban areas' 94 and that local traditions in the treatment of
debtors and creditors might be recognized by offering a more finely tuned
federal bankruptcy remedy. The local diversity rationale suggests that an.
opt-out state should be able to focus on bankruptcy to determine what the
needs of its debtors and creditors are in the bankruptcy context and should
legislate accordingly. ' 95 And if, indeed, a state were to conclude that its own
nonbankruptcy situation were different from bankruptcy, or that its debtors in
the two situations had different exemption needs, it would make little sense to
require that state to impose on debtors in bankruptcy exemptions developed
for debtors outside bankruptcy, or to require that state to develop one set of
exemptions to apply in two situations that it had concluded were different. If a
state is permitted to opt out and thereby conclude that the federal bankruptcy
exemptions are inappropriate for its debtors, it also should be able to determine the exemptions that are appropriate without being constricted by its own
nonbankruptcy exemption provisions.

192. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Gibbons, 102 S. Ct. 1169,
reh'gdenied, 102 S. Ct. 1997 (1982), while consistent in dicta with the view espoused in Stover, is not dispositive.
In Gibbons the Court struck down federal legislation applicable by its terms only to one debtor and indicated that,

at minimum, bankruptcy legislation had to be applicable to more than one debtor. Id. at 4263. While the issue with
which the opinion dealt is not specifically pertinent to the discussion here, the majority's, and particularly the
concurrence's, emphasis on the flexibility of congressional power under the bankruptcy clause suggests that a
uniformity clause challenge to an opt-out state's bankruptcy-only exemptions will fail.
193. See H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 126, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 6087; House Hearings, supra note 21, at 762 (statement of David Williams); id. at 2043 (statement of
William T. Plumb, Jr.).
194. From an economic perspective, this justification is flawed because economic diversity is regional and
is very seldom observed when one crosses state lines. Moreover, with increasing uniformity of state commercial
law, the related multistate nature of much of contemporary business, and the 20th century revolution in
communications and transportation, a justification based on state economic diversity seems misplaced. Cf.
Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions:A Full Circle Back to the Act of 1800?, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 667 (1968).
The legislative history sheds little light on the extent to which Congress actually considered the merits of
diversity in the opt-out compromise. The opt-out provision may well have been simply a political compromise
with little or no direct thought having been given to the question.
195. Cf. C. LINDBLOM, THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS (1968).
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Moreover, greater focus by opt-out states on the bankruptcy process and
on the exemption needs within that process can yield substantial benefits and,
indeed, can arguably help justify the Code's opt-out authorization itself.
Exemption provisions only recently have come to be recognized as vitally
important to the bankruptcy process.' 96 While the Code contains Congress'
formulation of the exemptions that optimally will advance bankruptcy policy,
the provisions are necessarily the product of broad compromise and are but a
first, recent effort at designing specific provisions to serve a perceived function in the bankruptcy process. The effectiveness of the federal exemptions in
meeting their design objectives will be unknown for many years. An opt-out
state's development of bankruptcy exemptions following a direct and undistracted focus on the policies to be advanced and the functions to be served by
exemptions within the Code can advance our knowledge of the roles exemptions play in the bankruptcy process and, perhaps, of the relationship between
bankruptcy exemptions and debtor revitalization. In short, local economic
and social experimentation,' 97 which the Code's opt-out provision makes possible,' 9s yields substantial federalism benefits. Those benefits will be maximized if opt-out states direct their exemption policymaking efforts specifically to the bankruptcy situation in which bankruptcy exemptions are to
operate. The remainder of this Article will suggest different approaches that
opt-out states might take in this process.
A. Policy Determinants
All exemptions by definition reserve some of the debtor's property free
from creditor claims. Eliminating a priori reasons for using state nonbankruptcy exemptions in bankruptcy frees a state to inquire more directly into
why it is preserving for the debtor in bankruptcy some of his property through
exemption provisions. One can add content to the exemption concept only by
deciding what purpose the exemption is to serve or what it is being designed
to do. Outside bankruptcy purposes of exemptions are varied and often
overlapping. For example, protecting the debtor's personal dignity is a policy
often articulated' 99 as a basis for exemption of items such as family pictures,
religious articles, or family keepsakes. 2 °° The policy of maintaining the debtor's productivity 2 l supports exemptions of tools of the trade and the loss-of196. See supra text accompanying notes 34-47.

197. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 309-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
198. The opt-out provision only makes such experimentation more possible because a state could develop
bankruptcy-only exemptions, which a debtor could choose through § 522(b), without opting out. The likely

press of other legislation, however, makes it unlikely that such a state would take on this legislative burden,
given the availability of the federal bankruptcy exemptions for its debtors.
199. E.g., Resnick, Prudent Planning or FraudulentTransfer? The Use ofNonexempt Assets to Purchase
or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 85 COMM. L.J. 238, 242-43 (1980).

200. Virtually all states protect such property either through exemptions specifically listing such items,
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 52, § 13(l)(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981), or through a blanket personal property
exemption with a limit that lets the debtor assess the personal value of such items and choose those of greatest
personal value, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-2-28-1 (Supp. 1981).
201. See Resnick, supra note 199, at 243.
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future-earning-capacity portion of a personal injury award, as well as restrictions on wage garnishment.202 The overarching, humanitarian policy of preventing the total destitution of the debtor or of the debtor and his family is
perhaps the most generally agreed upon policy underlying debtors' exemptions .203 All these policies might properly be reflected in exemptions for use in
bankruptcy, and suggestions of specific exemption provisions to advance
such policies are numerous. 204
But formulating exemptions for bankruptcy purposes is unlike formulating state debtors' exemptions because bankruptcy exemptions formulated by
an opt-out state must fit and operate within a much larger federal statute. A
state developing exemptions for bankruptcy is localizing one component of a
much larger federal law, which has reasonably well-defined goals and objectives set by Congress. The exemptions injected into the Code by an opt-out
state have the capability of advancing or retarding the federal objectives
within the opt-out state; a state risks the undoing of its opt-out legislation if
that legislation is perceived as thwarting federal objectives.205
As indicated earlier, a central objective of the reform movement culminating in the Bankruptcy Reform Act was to ensure that an individual emerged
from bankruptcy with a fresh start.206 The increased interest in bankruptcy7
exemptions preceding the Code and the criticism levelled at the old system,0
as well as legislative history of section 522 itself,203 suggest that reformers

perceived that exemptions in bankruptcy played a vital role in the fresh start a
debtor would receive with bankruptcy.
The fresh start seems to be a mixed idea of economic relief and revitalization, as expressed by the Supreme Court in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt-29 "One
of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to 'relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free
from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.' ,,210 Central is the notion that the removal of that "oppressive indebt202. Restrictions on wage garnishment are found both at the federal and state levels. E.g., Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8127 (Purdon 1981).
203. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 17, at 446-48; Resinick, supra note 199, at 241-43; Vukowich,
Debtors' Eremption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 784 (1974). Cf. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note42, part I, 172;
R. WAPLES, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION 764 (1893). Approaches that limit exemption rights to heads of
families, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, § I (Supp. 1981), also reflect a strong policy of

family protection or promotion. See R. WAPLES, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION 3 (1893).
204. See, e.g., UNIFORM EXEMPTIONS ACT (1979); Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J.
779, 866-76 (1974); Note, supra note 12, at 1459-1514.

205. Two opt-out statutes have been held unconstitutional under the supremacy clause as being in conflict
with overriding federal policies: Tennessee's, Rhodes v. Stewart (In re Rhodes), 14 Bankr. 629 (Bankr. N.D.
Tenn. 1981), and Illinois', Bradshaw v. Beneficial Fin. Co. (In re Balgemann), 16 Bankr. 780 (Bankr. N.D. 111.
1982). Illinois' statute has been brought back to life by the Seventh Circuit. In re Sullivan, No. 81-1921 (7th Cir.
May 19, 1982). See infra text accompanying notes 236-44.

'206. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
208. H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963, 6087. See also supra note 64.
209. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).

210. Id. at 244 (quoting Williams v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)).
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edness" might reinstate the positive incentive of personal gain thought important in order to revitalize the debtor's productivity.2 1' Given voluntary bankruptcy as a remedy for troubled debtors, 212 it is in the interests of debtors,
creditors, and the state alike that this revitalizing potential of bankruptcy be
maximized. Conversely, it is in no one's interest to permit voluntary bankruptcy on the one hand but to insert into the Code a set of state exemptions
that make debtor revitalization unlikely.2"3 An opt-out state's focus on the
bankruptcy process and on the role of exemptions in the debtor's fresh start
can reduce the risk that local bankruptcy will not achieve the debtor revitalization that is a partial justification for the bankruptcy process itself."
B. Illustrative Approaches

Two opt-out states that have separated exemptions for bankruptcy purposes from nonbankruptcy exemptions illustrate different approaches to the
creation of state exemptions specifically designed for bankruptcy.
One approach is to deal only with bankruptcy exemptions in connection
with an opt-out. Georgia followed this pattern and modelled a set of bankruptcy-only exemptions on the federal exemptions in the Code.215 Indeed, Georgia
so replicated the federal scheme that it continues to offer debtors a choice of
exemptions in bankruptcy even though it has opted out. 216 The approach's
merits are in separating the bankruptcy situation for focussed treatment and in
using as a model the federal exemptions, which were specifically designed for
the Code and with the fresh start in mind. This is an economical approach
because much of the legislative work in the area of bankruptcy exemptionshearings, opinion solicitation, and drafting-has been completed by Congress, and much of it is readily transferable to the state level. The Georgia
approach may also avoid state constitutional and federal contracts clause

211. See J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 100 (1956); Rendleman, The
Bankruptcy Discharge:Toward a FresherStart, 58 N.C.L. REV. 723, 726 (1980); Whitford, A Critiqueof the
Consumer Credit Collection System, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 1047, 1100; Discussion, Economics ofBankruptcy, 41
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 150-51 (1977).
212. There have been suggestions that voluntary bankruptcy should be restricted more than it is now,
perhaps through involuntary Chapter 13 plans. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 953, 976-91 (1981). The suggestion was rejected by Congress in enacting the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 120-21 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963, 6080-82, and had been rejected by Congress at least once earlier. Id.
213. "It does not serve the public interest to enforce the expectations of the creditor at the expense of

making the debtor a ward of the state." Curry v. Associates Fin. Serv., I I Bankr. 716,718 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1981). CJ. House Hearings, supra note 21, at 341 (statement of Prof. Vein Countryman).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.
215. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1301.1 (Supp. 1981). West Virginia has also followed this pattern. W. VA. CODE
§ 38-104 (Supp. 1982). Compare Delaware, which permits debtors in bankruptcy or state insolvency proceedings $5000 worth of any property, without regard to exemptions available outside of such proceedings. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4914(b) (Supp. 1981).
216. The Georgia choice is between the bankruptcy-only exemptions and the exemptions available to
debtors generally. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1301.1 (Supp. 1981).
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restrictions on expanding obsolete exemptions 217 on the theory that a state
which creates such bankruptcy exemptions is exercising delegated federal
21 8
authority
and that neither restriction applies to delegated federal author2 19
ity.
An alternative approach is suggested by Ohio's exemption legislation.
That state extensively reconsidered and rewrote its state exemption statutes,
made most exemptions applicable to debtors in both situations and, in addition, added specific exemptions for bankruptcy debtors only. Ohio permitted
its debtors to exempt an220 additional eight hundred dollars in cash and other
property in bankruptcy.
Since exemptions in bankruptcy share a number of the same purposes as
exemptions outside bankruptcy, there are legislative economies to be gained
by considering exemptions for both systems at the same time. The policy of
preventing total destitution might, for example, generate a number of exemptions for use in both systems. 22 ' Once the step of constructing exemptions
to satisfy exemption policy goals shared by the bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy system is completed, the second step is to develop specific exemptions to
satisfy goals not shared by the two systems. For bankruptcy, this requires a
focus on the central idea of debtor revitalization and a determination whether
that purpose or the context of a bankruptcy proceeding or both require more,
less, or different types of debtor property to be protected.
This analysis should also take into account the different context in
which bankruptcy places the debtor, 222 bankruptcy's greater efficiency in
separating the debtor from nonexempt assets,223 the implications of the bank-

217. Inadequate state exemptions, state constitutional restrictions on expanding them, and the thought that
the relatively larger federal bankruptcy exemptions would increase the bankruptcy rates prompted one commentator to call for an opt-out despite the inadequacies of the state exemptions. Lacy, South Carolina's Statutory
Exemptions and Consumer Bankruptcy, 30 S.C.L. REV. 643, 687-94 (1979). In that state it was said that any

changes in state debtors' exemptions had to be preceded by a state consitutional amendment. Id.
218. See Bradshaw v. Beneficial Fin. Co. (ln re Balgemann), 16 Bankr. 780,781-82 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982);
Rhodes v. Stewart (In re Rhodes), 14 Bankr. 629,631 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981). Cf. In re Sullivan, No. 81-1921

(7th Cir. May 19, 1982), discussed supra note 64, infra note 243.
219. Cf. Countryman, supra note 43, at 728-30.

220. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.66(A)(4)(a), (A)(17) (Page Supp. 1982). Kentucky, a state taking a
similar approach, gives debtors in bankruptcy an additional $1000. KY. REV. STAT. § 427.160 (Supp. 1981).
Arkansas adds bankruptcy exemptions for the debtor's residence, motor vehicle, wedding bands, and tools and

implements. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 36-210(a) (Supp. 1981). North Dakota adds an exemption of $7500 in lieu of a
homestead exemption and exemptions for the debtor's motor vehicle, life insurance, and proceeds from various
rights of action. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-03.1 (Supp. 1981).

One can infer from these differences only that the state legislature thought that bankruptcy was different.
Whether the perceived difference was policy, procedure, or other aspects of the differing effects of bankruptcy

on the debtor is unknown.
221. A legislature constructing exemptions for use in both systems should recognize the differential impact
the differing procedure, exemption-related rules, and context will likely produce. See supra text accompanying

notes 135-64. If these differences can be quantified, they might appropriately be reflected in different provisions
for the two systems.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 161-64.

223. In bankruptcy the debtor is stripped of all assets that are not exempt. By comparison, state collection
machinery is extremely inefficient in separating a debtor from all nonexempt assets. See generally Leff, Injury,
Ignorance, and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 5-18 (1970). It would seem,
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ruptcy discharge, which is unavailable outside bankruptcy, 224 and the
potentially different socioeconomic classes to whom bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy exemptions might be most useful2 5 Differences in any of these
areas or in fundamental purposes of exemptions within the two systems might
well be reflected in different exemption provisions applicable in the two systems. 226 One can only speculate on how these differences might translate into
different exemption treatment. 227 Ohio's appoach of recognizing differences
in the form of a modest exemption in addition to exemptions provided to
debtors generally 228 229
certainly should be but a point of departure for other
creative approaches.
C. PioneeringPossibilities
The Ohio approach requires an answer to the question, "What is different about bankruptcy or about debtors in that process?" The central policy
difference is the fresh start policy of bankruptcy, not present outside bankruptcy. This suggests a final approach that would be considerably more pioneering: to consider directly the exemption implications of the fresh start
and to attempt to develop exemptions in response to those implications.
Threshold questions to be pursued are whether the fresh start idea is a useful
construct in developing bankruptcy exemptions and what the idea might mean
in the exemption context. These are obviously areas ripe for further analysis
and research. One possibility is suggested by cases and statutory reforms
articulating the fresh start policy.
Many cases and reforms alike implement the fresh start by attempting to
separate the bankruptcy past clearly and decisively from the future. The
emphasis in the fresh start is on making a clean break with the economic past.
For example, concluding that vacation pay which accrued prior to bankruptcy
was not property of the estate under the 1898 Act, the Court in Lines v.
2 0
Frederick
opined:
therefore, that a debtor outside bankruptcy in most places will at any given time have more nonexempt or

nonimmune assets than will the debtor in bankruptcy with the same exemption protection.
On the other hand, any widespread creation and recognition of security interests in exempt assets would
tend to decrease the protection the debtor outside bankruptcy would receive from state exemption statutes. See
supra text accompanying notes 144-51.
224. At minimum, the debtor with a bankruptcy discharge and relief from continued creditor collection
efforts probably has a better chance for future solvency than his counterpart without a discharge.
225. See supra note 164.
226. If exemption users in the two systems are primarily of different socioeconomic classes, an implication
of different exemptions for the two systems is that the two classes will be treated differently. An equal
protection attack on the Ohio statute based on its differing treatment of debtors in the two systems failed in In re
Bloom, 5 Bankr. 451 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
227. It has been suggested, for example, that the bankruptcy debtor's discharge justifies lower bankruptcy
exemptions. See Vukowich, Debtors' Eremption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REV.

769, 802 (1980). No state has taken such an approach. See, e.g., supra note 220.
228. It is unknown what differences in the two systems Ohio's $800 represents. See supra note 220.
229. See also supra note 221. Iowa has also recognized that bankruptcy is a different situation for a debtor
and has provided bankrupt debtors a special S1000 cash exemption, which is applied against the total $5000
available to all debtors for various categories of property. IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.6 (West Supp. 1982).
230. 400 U.S. 18 (1970).
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The wage-earning bankrupt who must take a vacation without pay or forego a

vacation altogether cannot be said to have achieved the "new opportunity in life
and [the] clear field for future effort unhampered by the pressure and discouragement 23of1 preexisting debt,".., which it was the purpose of the statute to provide.

A similar thrust is also seen in many bankruptcy reforms. The broadening of
the automatic stay and discharge injuctions,22 the prohibition of governmental units from discriminating against former bankrupts 23 3 and the elaborate
procedures required for a debtor to reaffirm a prior debt m all suggest a
concern with the cleavage of the bankruptcy past from the debtor's future.
The "clear field for future effort" apparently follows the discharge of debt
because with the discharge come spending and investing options foreclosed

prior to bankruptcy. If there are incentive aspects to the fresh start, it appears
that they are conceptually related to these options.
One might speculate at this point on implications for bankruptcy exemption policymakers. Building on the cleavage notion, perhaps the objective
should be to ensure that discharged debt is not simply replaced with new
involuntary demands on postbankruptcy income, such as rental or debt payments to obtain necessary furniture, tools, appliances, or other property required by the typical person emerging from bankruptcy, regardless of the
financial ability to procure them. If a prime focus is to maintain the incentive of relatively free use of one's income, exemptions developed for bankruptcy purposes might ultimately turn out more generous than nonbankruptcy
exemptions designed
to prevent the debtor's total destitution or to preserve
23 6
personal dignity.
231.
232.
Start, 58
233.
Start, 58
234.

Id. at 20 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934)).
11U.S.C. §§ 362, 524 (1980). See generally Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge:Toward a Fresher
N.C.L. REV. 723, 750-54 (1980).
11 U.S.C. § 525 (1980). See generally Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher
N.C.L. REV. 723, 754-56 (1980).
11 U.S.C. § 524(c)-(d) (1980).

235. "Involuntary" and "necessary" are normative standards that simply move the problem to a different
arena. One still must determine which and how much exempt property is dictated by those standards. One could

attempt to develop exemptions to suit the typical or average debtor in bankruptcy, a person who may well be
better off socioeconomically than persons for whom nonbankruptcy exemptions might be formulated. Alternatively, it might be possible to use a more personalized approach, which would focus on the individual debtor and
his necessities given his particular needs. Cf. Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of
1800?, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 680 (1968).

236. Generosity in bankruptcy exemptions is likely to encounter substantial opposition from creditor
interests from whom the value of exempt property is transferred. In a more obvious way than other aspects of
bankruptcy, bankruptcy exemptions involve a redistribution of property. See Schuchman, An Attempt at a
"PhilosophyofBankruptcy," 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 403,471-74 (1973); Meckling, FinancialMarkets, Defaults,
and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 25 (1977). An exemption has a

relatively direct impact on creditors, who do not obtain distribution of the exempt property, and on their
customers, who in turn, bear part of the theoretically increased costs of credit. See Weston, Some Economic
Fundamentalsfor an Analysis of Bankruptcy, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 48-61 (1977). Therefore,

insofar as exemptions advance fresh start policy, the advance is financed by creditors and their customers.
Creditor opposition is predictable and understandable because for the nearly certain cost of an exemption to
creditor interests, a benefit of unknown value is promised. We know very little about the economic effects of a
fresh start and even less about the extent to which bankruptcy exemptions contribute to the unknown benefit. It
is hoped that the opportunity for state experimentation offered by the opt-out provision will lead to some

answers to these questions.
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Whatever the approach a state might take to providing or advancing the
fresh start through bankruptcy exemptions, it clearly makes practical sense
for a state at minimum to avoid depriving a debtor in bankruptcy of a fresh
start by incorporating into the Code through an opt-out a set of exemptions
23 7
designed for other purposes. While they are in conflict with In re Sullivan, a
later decision of a court of appeals, two lower courts built on the fresh start
objectives articulated in the bankruptcy reform movement and invalidated
two state opt-outs for their failure to provide the debtor before the court with
23
a fresh start. The Rhodes v. Stewart (In re Rhodes) s bankruptcy court

invalidated the Tennessee opt-out because the resulting state exemptions incorporated into the Code discriminated against nonhomeowners by providing
them nothing comparable to the Tennessee homestead exemption.2 And the
24
court in Bradshaw v. Beneficial Finance Co. (In re Balgemann), 0 relying on
Rhodes, invalidated the Illinois opt-out for similar reasons. Both courts analyzed the opt-out authorization as Congress' partial delegation of bankruptcy
policymaking to the states and opined that with that delegation came the fresh
start guidelines found in the Code.24' Although the Seventh Circuit's analysis
in Sullivan disagrees on the delegation question, it may be that a number of
state opt-outs that afford special protection to householders 4 are in jeopardy. 243 It also seems likely that debtors will mount other challenges to opt-outs
on the ground that the federal right to a fresh start is inadequately protected

237. No. 81-1921 (7th Cir. 1982).
238. 14 Bankr. 629 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981).
239. Id. at 634-35.
240. 16 Bankr. 780 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982). Balgemann is no longer good authority because of the contrary
decision in Sullivan, which sustained the Illinois opt-out.
241. 14 Bankr. 629, 633 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981); 16 Bankr. 780, 782-84 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1982). The
Rhodes court relied heavily on Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981), which it said supported its
conclusion that the opt-out authority is a considerably circumscribed delegation of federal authority.
242. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-10-2 (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2301 (Supp. 1982).
243. The Seventh Circuit's analysis may be open to question.
As discussed, supra note 64, the Sullivan court opined that it was the Senate's intent to allow states to set
bankruptcy exemption levels for their debtors as they had under the 1898 Act. Interpretation of the opt-out
compromise, as the Sullivan court recognized, requires reconciliation of this position with that of the House,
which did not entirely entrust to the states the exemption components of the bankruptcy fresh start. One infers
from a compromise that each house of Congress moved somewhat from its initial position. The Sullivan court
suggests that the movement on the Senate side was from its initial position to that of allowing state law to control
bankruptcy exemptions only when a state affirmatively chose to exercise that power. Unfortunately, the opinion
can be read to suggest that, as a matter of congressional intent, state power in this regard is unconstrained and
beyond inquiry even if it clashes with the fresh start policy, which the court attributed only to the House. Given
the history of the development of the Code and the evils to which it was responding, it seems difficult to
attribute to Congress such an intent.
An alternative closer to the middle ground seems at least as plausible. Given the clear intent of the House
on the question, the fresh start thrust of other major provisions of both the Senate and House bills, the Senate's
own recognition of the fresh start in this context (see supra note 64), the reduction of the dollar limits of the
federal exemptions found in the House bill pursuant to its compromise with the Senate (see 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6521), and the criticism of the Senate provision in Senate hearings on the House and
Senate bills (see Senate Hearingsat 619, 650, 684, 835; cf. id. at 578), Congress may have given opt-out states a
considerable range of discretion to determine bankruptcy exemptions for their debtors, subject at the fringes to
the overriding fresh start policy found in the legislative history and throughout the provisions of the Code.
In any event, fresh start standards may well be constitutionally required regardless of Congress' intent to
provide them. In this regard, the Code differs substantially from the 1898 Act, which preceded it. The Sullivan
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under an opt-out state's resulting exemptions.2 4 It undoubtedly will take
considerable time to work out the federalism implications of the Code's optout provisions.
Local economic implications also may follow a state's depriving a debtor
of a fresh start through its exemption provisions. If the fresh start of bankruptcy does revitalize some debtors, 245 and if bankruptcy exemptions can
influence the odds in favor of revitalization, it could make economic sense for
a state to ensure that its debtors who choose voluntary bankruptcy are not
deprived of the revitalization potential that bankruptcy offers. Unlike most
debtors outside of bankruptcy, the honest bankrupt debtor emerges from the
process with no assets but those given exempt status by the legislature. If
those assets are insufficient to combine with the discharge to produce a reasonable chance at a fresh start, the result probably will be fewer effective
bankruptcies, because the discharge and the immediate relief from creditor
collection efforts probably will continue to attract many debtors to bankruptcy despite its lack of any revitalization potential. z46 If lowered economic
court concluded that there was no unconstitutional delegation of federal power because states retain the power
to enact bankruptcy laws as long as such laws do not conflict with federal bankruptcy legislation. No. 81-1921,
slip op. at 13 (7th Cir. May 19, 1982). According to the court, state exemptions in bankruptcy were merely an
exercise of states' preexisting bankruptcy powers; there could be no conflict with the Code because, as a matter
of congressional intent, Congress expressly permitted states to make their own exemption provisions effective
without regard to the fresh start. Assuming the court is correct on intent, the court's conclusion here ultimately
is bottomed on the notion that it is state power, not federal bankruptcy power, that a state exercises when its
exemption provisions are made effective in bankruptcy through an opt-out. The court could "find no distinction, relevant to the delegation argument, between the 1898 Act and the Code." Id.
The Code does not simply recognize state law in the area of exemptions as the Act did, however. To the
contrary, under the Code a state's power to make state exemptions operate in bankruptcy comes from the Code
itself and not from preexisting state power; without the opt-out authorization, there would be no state power to
control exemptions in bankruptcy at all. While it is not without doubt, opting out seems more realistically to be a
state exercise of federally granted power under the Code rather than an exercise of preexisting state power to
enact state bankruptcy laws. The extreme detail of the Code and the narrow scope given to state exemptions
operating in bankruptcy, see supra text accompanying notes 143-60, reinforce the impression.
If the opt-out provision is, in fact, a delegation of federal power, with that delegation must come standards
for its exercise. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Incorporating fresh start
standards into the exercise of a state's opt-out power gives the opt-out provision a constitutional interpretation
consistent with a view of the role of exemptions expressed by both houses of Congress prior to the opt-out
compromise. See generally Note, Determiningthe Constitutionalityof the Bankruptcy Code "Opt Out" Provisions: A CriticalLook at In re Sullivan, 15 IND. L. REV. 849 (1982).
In any event, there are, as discussed in the text, a variety ofother reasons supporting a state's considering
the bankruptcy fresh start in developing exemptions for use within the Bankruptcy Code whether or not that focus
is required by federal law.
244. One such challenge based on the failure of some states to consider the Code's expanded property of
the estate occurred to the Rhodes court: "If, for example, states fail to provide exemptions for such property as
tort claims and alimony they would effectively deny to debtors with significant rights to such property interests
the filing of a bankruptcy petition as a means of dealing with their debts." 14 Bankr. 629, 633 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1981).
245. If revitalization can be partly measured by a debtor's staying clear of a second bankruptcy, the
Brookings Study data are impressive: No more than 22% of all debtors in any bankruptcy proceedings had prior
insolvency proceedings experience. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 58-59 (1971).
246. Stanley and Girth reported that some 43% of the personal bankrupts they interviewed listed threats of
legal action as the immediate cause of their seeking bankruptcy relief. Id. at 47. Actual legal action constituted
the immediate cause for another 18%, and 15% said they went bankrupt "to avoid paying debts." Id. at 43.
It appears that there is an incentive toward bankruptcy because bankruptcy offers significant debtor relief
that is generally unavailable under state law. A state wishing to decrease its bankruptcy rate might consider
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productivity or increased demands on the public assistance system result
from the loss of revitalization potential-and these are questions for economic
analysis-the expense may be borne by all state citizens.2 47
The Code has left us at a point of departure for further analysis and
empirical study. The relationship between exemptions and the bankruptcy
fresh start, the economic impact on a state of particular types and quantities
of exemptions for use in bankruptcy, and indeed, whether the fresh start is
useful at all either in generating specific exemption provisions or in effecting a
revitalization of debtors following bankruptcy are areas about which very
little is known. The Code's opt-out provision and the recent crystallization of
the fresh start policy have combined to offer a unique opportunity for local
experimentation, which can supply data to help answer some of these questions. The bulk of current opt-out legislation has not made use of the opportunity.
A first and necessary step is wider recognition that the past operation of
state law in bankruptcy cannot be recreated by the simple device of an opt-out
and that the operation and objectives of the bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy
systems have changed sufficiently in the last fifty years to be considered
separately for policymaking purposes. These constraints on creativity removed, the promise of innovative local legislation to advance articulated federal
objectives in the best spirit of federalism seems more possible.
V. CONCLUSION

A survey of the opt-out states suggests that the simple insertion of state
exemptions into the Code effected by most opt-outs has created and will
create difficult problems of interpretation and costs to the bankruptcy system.
Those problems are due largely to an expansion of the bankruptcy estate to

include interests in property that creditors cannot reach under state law and
that therefore are not found within a state's exemption statutes. Beyond that,
the opt-out pattern suggests a prevailing notion that exemptions should or
must be the same in both systems. There seem to be no persuasive reasons to
support that idea. Considering the systems separately and designing exemp-

increasing available debtor protection under state law. This would, by hypothesis, reduce the relative attractive-

ness of bankruptcy and might lower the bankruptcy rate. Indeed, the Brookings Study suggests that a state can
have a real impact on its own bankruptcy rate by increasing debtor protection. The researchers found that
relatively high bankruptcy rates were related to relatively low exemptions of wages from creditor garnishment,
and vice versa. Id. at 23641. Cf. Schuchman & Jantscher, Effects of Federal Exemption from Wage
Garnishmenton Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Rates, 77 COM. L.J. 360 (1972).
247. The distributional aspects of this analysis are relevant to the further question, "Who should bear the

expenses associated with the bankruptcy fresh start?" To the extent the fresh start is advanced by exemption
provisions, creditors and their customers pay for the benefits that are more widely distributed; to the extent that
inadequate exemptions impair the fresh start, creditors and their customers benefit from larger property distributions while a wider population suffers from lower productivity and higher demands for public assistance. That
creditors profit from debt creation might justify their financing debtor revitalization. On the other hand, because
the public in general theoretically benefits from fresh starts, perhaps the cost of producing such benefits should
be publicly financed. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 449.
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tions to suit the different needs of the two systems offer a potentially closer
relationship between policy concerns and legislation, an opportunity for new
thinking in the area, and a better chance at legislation suited to the needs of
modem creditors and debtors.
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